Intermarket network externalities occur when the utility of a good produced in a given industry varies with the size of the demand for a good produced in another. A particularly significant example of this phenomenon is provided by the interaction between the media and advertising industries. Media consumers vary according to their willingness to pay for a media good, which depends on the advertising volume. In the advertising market, advertisers vary according to their willingness to pay for an advertisement, which also depends positively on the audience reached. We model a situation of competition between two content providers who are rivals in both the media and advertising industries, choosing simultaneously the newspaper prices and the advertising rates. We characterize the equilibria of the game and explore how they depend on audience attitudes towards advertising. Our main finding is that two‐sided interactions may induce exit by one of the media companies from either only the advertising market or both markets.

In recent years, cities such as Venice, Dubrovnik, Paris and Barcelona have experienced an exponential increase in visitor numbers leading to episodes of tourismphobia by anti-tourism movements, or even the decline of the destination. Among other solutions, some destinations see film-induced tourism as a possible way of diversifying tourism supply and demand. Through the analysis of the locations of six thematic film routes in Barcelona compared to the same locations on the largest online travel review platform, TripAdvisor, it is concluded that, far from spreading out tourist flows, fiction-induced tourism in Barcelona has concentrated tourism at the main attractions of the city. Only a few exceptions of films with minor audiences lead tourists off the beaten track. Overall, this paper provides a set of recommendations, strategies and challenges for destination managers to help alleviate overtourism and to offer more sustainable tourism away from spots that attract mass tourism.

We consider a common situation in energy markets: an incumbent firm provides an 'essential' good under ubiquity and uniform pricing requirements, while competing in two-part tariffs with an entrant providing a non-essential substitute. We find that consumers' captivity to the essential good allows the incumbent to partly appropriate the surplus brought to the economy by the entrant. Surprisingly, the ubiquity requirement induces more aggressive pricing by the incumbent (below marginal cost) and reduced entry, despite "cream-skimming" by the entrant. Far from being a burden, universal service obligations might thus confer strategic advantages to incumbents.