No abstract

Conveying that psychoanalysis offers rich opportunities for the very early treatment of autistic spectrum disorders, this clinical communication unfolds the clinical process of a 19-month-old 'shell-type' encapsulated mute autistic girl. It details how, in a four-weekly-sessions schedule, infant Lila evolved within two years from being emotionally out-of-contact to the affective aliveness of oedipal involvement. Following Frances Tustin's emphasis on the analyst's 'quality of attention' and Justin Call's advice that in baby-mother interaction the infant is the initiator and the mother is the follower, it is described how the analyst must, amid excruciating non-response, even-mindedly sustain her attention in order to meet the child half-way at those infrequent points where flickers of initiative on her side are adumbrated. This helps attain evanescent 'moments of contact' which coalesce later into 'moments of sharing', eventually leading to acknowledgment of the analyst's humanness and a receptiveness for to-and-fro communication. Thus the 'primal dialogue' (Spitz) is reawakened and, by experiencing herself in the mirror of the analyst, the child's sense of I-ness is reinstated. As evinced by the literature, the mainstream stance rests on systematic early interpretation of the transference, which has in our view strongly deterred progress in the psychoanalytic treatment of autistic spectrum disorders.

95 hardcover $13.95 softcover. WHY WE ARE NOT NIETZSCHEANS. Edited by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 256 pp., 1997, $45.00 hardcover, $15.95 softcover.

The author explores how psychoanalysis mutates in its passing from the privacies of the session to the public spaces of academia, shifting away from enquiry into unfolding unconscious psychic processes guided by its method, and from the clinically based notions Freud and his diverse followers constructed, here called the 'Freudian unconscious'. In postmodern intellectual contexts Freud's work fuels a 'Nietzschean unconscious', issuing from public lecterns in the protagonistic, self-creating feats of a 'psychoanalytic discourse'. The ideology of such mutation is here traced from Nietzsche on to Heidegger and Kojève, and then to Lacan and Laplanche. It reflects the might of the 'death of evidences' and the Romantic penchant for the limit-experience and the primacy accorded to the creative imagination. Discourse as revelation rests on a 'paradox of the enunciation' whereby the subject (author) of the statement is taken to be identical to the subject (matter) of the statement. Banishing the boundaries of illusion and evidence, and of self-overcoming and insight, academic 'psychoanalytic discourse' creates a 'return of the idols' in 'theoretical' narcissistic identification.

The author explores how psychoanalysis mutates in its passing from the privacies of the session to the public spaces of academia, shifting away from enquiry into unfolding unconscious psychic processes guided by its method, and from the clinically based notions Freud and his diverse followers constructed, here called the ‘Freudian unconscious’. In postmodern intellectual contexts Freud's work fuels a ‘Nietzschean unconscious’, issuing from public lecterns in the protagonistic, self‐creating feats of a ‘psychoanalytic discourse’. The ideology of such mutation ishere traced from Nietzsche on to Heidegger and Kojave, and then to Lacan and Laplanche. It reflects the might of the ‘death of evidences’ and the Romantic penchant for the limit‐experience and the primacy accorded to the creative imagination. Discourse as revelation rests on a ‘paradox of the enunciation’ whereby the subject (author) of the statement is taken to be identical to the subject (matter) of the statement. Banishing the boundaries of illusion and evidence, and of self‐overcoming and insight, academic ‘psychoanalytic discourse’creates a ‘return of the idols’ in ‘theoretical’ narcissistic identification.