Many computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems have integrated drug safety alerts. The authors reviewed the literature on physician response to drug safety alerts and interpreted the results using Reason's framework of accident causation. In total, 17 papers met the inclusion criteria. Drug safety alerts are overridden by clinicians in 49% to 96% of cases. Alert overriding may often be justified and adverse drug events due to overridden alerts are not always preventable. A distinction between appropriate and useful alerts should be made. The alerting system may contain error-producing conditions like low specificity, low sensitivity, unclear information content, unnecessary workflow disruptions, and unsafe and inefficient handling. These may result in active failures of the physician, like ignoring alerts, misinterpretation, and incorrect handling. Efforts to improve patient safety by increasing correct handling of drug safety alerts should focus on the error-producing conditions in software and organization. Studies on cognitive processes playing a role in overriding drug safety alerts are lacking.

Most studies of the impact of information systems in organizations tend to see the implementation process as a "rollout" of technology, as a technical matter removed from organizational dynamics. There is substantial agreement that the success of implementing information systems is determined by organizational factors. However, it is less clear what these factors are. The authors propose to characterize the introduction of an information system as a process of mutual shaping. As a result, both the technology and the practice supported by the technology are transformed, and specific technical and social outcomes gradually emerge. The authors suggest that insights from social studies of science and technology can help to understand an implementation process. Focusing on three theoretical aspects, the authors argue first that the implementation process should be understood as a thoroughly social process in which both technology and practice are transformed. Second, following Orlikowski's concept of "emergent change," they suggest that implementing a system is, by its very nature, unpredictable. Third, they argue that success and failure are not dichotomous and static categories, but socially negotiated judgments. Using these insights, the authors have analyzed the implementation of a computerized physician order entry (CPOE) system in a large Dutch university medical center. During the course of this study, the full implementation of CPOE was halted, but the aborted implementation exposed issues on which the authors did not initially focus.

Previous studies have shown the importance of workflow issues in the implementation of CPOE systems and patient safety practices. To understand the impact of CPOE on clinical workflow, we developed a conceptual framework and conducted a literature search for CPOE evaluations between 1990 and June 2007. Fifty-one publications were identified that disclosed mixed effects of CPOE systems. Among the frequently reported workflow advantages were the legible orders, remote accessibility of the systems, and the shorter order turnaround times. Among the frequently reported disadvantages were the time-consuming and problematic user-system interactions, and the enforcement of a predefined relationship between clinical tasks and between providers. Regarding the diversity of findings in the literature, we conclude that more multi-method research is needed to explore CPOE's multidimensional and collective impact on especially collaborative workflow.

Although the Dutch drug database is already a selected reduction from all DDIs mentioned in literature, the majority of respondents wanted to turn off DDI alerts to reduce alert overload. Turning off DDI alerts hospital-wide appeared to be problematic because of differences among physicians regarding drug-related knowledge and of differences across the hospital in routine drug monitoring practices. Furthermore, several reasons for suppression of alerts could be questioned from a safety perspective. Further research should investigate when each of the following might help: changes in alert texts; new differential alert triggers based on clinician knowledge or specialty; and nonintrusive alert presentation so long as serum levels and patient parameters are measured and stay within limits.