This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents and the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules.

A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes how to e ciently connect a group of individuals to a source. Once the e cient tree is obtained, the addressed question is how to allocate the total cost among the involved agents. One prominent solution in allocating this minimum cost is the so-called Folk solution. Unfortunately, in general, the Folk solution is not easy to compute. We identify a class of mcst problems in which the Folk solution is obtained in an easy way.