Exposure to a single report about terrorism in the mass media can trigger a range of emotional and political reactions. The consequences of exposure to several terrorism reports in row, however, are a matter of controversy. We examine the effects of prolonged terrorism coverage using an experimental design that combines self-report measures of emotions and political attitudes with instantaneous biometric data on emotions. Consistent with research on nonassociational learning, we find that exposure to multiple videos habituates people to depictions of terrorism: the longer people watch terrorism coverage, the less intense their reactions are to the images of terrorism they see. Some images and videos, however, contribute to this result more than others. This suggests that the ultimate effects of terrorism coverage depend on the interplay between the quantity and quality of reporting, not the quantity alone.

What allows unpopular judiciaries to gain the trust of the public? Some suggest that judicial confidence depends on procedural integrity. Others emphasize the importance of ideological congruence between the court and the public. This article examines the explanatory power of these two leading hypotheses while also paying closer attention to the moderating effects of political and economic inclusion. It finds that confidence in the judiciary is driven by normative considerations when inclusion is high, but by ideological proximity when inclusion is low. The findings highlight that institutional support does not emerge from a single causal path. Instead, inequalities in the economic and political structure make people trust institutions for different—and sometimes contrasting—reasons.

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Does human rights advocacy make a difference? Many are skeptical. Studies often find that advocates have an impact only under limited circumstances. I argue that these underwhelming results are a by-product of an identification problem. Research so far has effectively focused on whether shaming campaigns reduce ongoing abuse. But such cases are only part of the story. Another big aspect of advocacy is preventing abuse from ever starting. We must then pay attention to the deterred, those who chose not to violate human rights because of the threat of shaming. These cases do not repress and are never shamed. They are easy to miss because they look the same as those who never considered abuse in the first place. However, identifying deterred cases is crucial for judging the effectiveness of advocacy. I argue that we can resolve this issue by focusing on the degree of human rights monitoring in a country. Doing so allows researchers to recognize those under the scrutiny of advocates, and hence those that could have been deterred even if they were never shamed. Once we do this analytical refocus it is easy to see the positive effect of human rights advocacy. Human rights monitoring reduces abuse, and it does so in most countries.

What allows autocratic political elites to coordinate with each other and check dictators? Earlier work assumes that elite coordination becomes easier as dictators share more power. I argue that, even when power-sharing is pervasive, a lack of cohesiveness can rob regime members of their influence over dictators. Conflicting interests can leave seemingly powerful elites unable to agree on when or how to challenge the dictator. I develop a measure of elite collective action based on this framework. It documents not only how much power elites have, but also the obstacles they would need to resolve to work together. In doing so, it better describes the relationship between autocrats and their ruling coalition, and its added nuance allows it to recover findings that current measures miss. By paying closer attention to the cohesion of autocratic elites, this paper explains why some dictators can rule tyrannically without retribution, and why weaker elites can still constrain powerful autocrats.