Mixed oligopoly, Privatization, Merger, L00, L13, L33,

This paper analyzes the optimal privatization policy when firms endogenously choose their strategic variable. The level of privatization is shown to determine: (i) the choice of strategic variable, whereby an asymmetric equilibrium could emerge (either Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot); (ii) the stability of equilibrium when the partially privatized firm and the private firm choose quantity and price respectively as the strategic variable; and (iii) the level of welfare, whereby Cournot–Cournot and Bertrand–Cournot games could lead to a greater welfare than the Bertrand–Bertrand model.

In this paper, we modify the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma by adding an initial round in which the players have the option of simultaneously, unilaterally and publicly committing themselves, in an enforceable way, to a subset of their strategies. We show that when a large enough number of repetitions of the prisoners' dilemma follow this initial commitment round, then not only do the players have incentives to commit themselves to a limited strategy set, but there is also a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which both players act cooperatively throughout the post-commitment stages of the game.

By employing a simple three-country model in which there are two exporting countries and one consuming country, this paper analyses the consequences of one-country strategic distortion of the objectives of trade policy. It finds that although an exporting country can benefit from strategic distortion, it would be preferred that the importing country distorts its policy. Furthermore, it is found that preferential trading agreements can emerge endogenously.Trade policy, economic integration, commitment, distortion of objective functions,

This paper explores how the formation of customs unions affects the argument for export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets. It is shown that the existence of customs unions may eliminate the incentive for their members to subsidize exports as customs unions grow larger. Therefore, it can be affirmed that regionalism and multilateralism are complementary processes.