Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions lays down an obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. This paper focuses on the second part of this obligation, in particular on the responsibility of third States not involved in a given armed conflict to take action in order to safeguard compliance with the Geneva Conventions by the parties to the conflict. It concludes that third States have an international legal obligation not only to avoid encouraging international humanitarian law violations committed by others, but also to take measures to put an end to on-going violations and to actively prevent their occurrence.

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Over the past few years privatized military firms (PMFs) have allegedly committed all kind of war crimes, including torture. Prisoners' abuses at Abu Ghraib or indiscriminate firing against civilian vehicles to the rhythm of Elvis Presley's "Runaway Train" are but a couple of examples of the excesses revealed by the public media. Nonetheless, members of PMFs have hardly been held accountable. "Lawlessness" and "weak laws" have been blamed for these striking cases of impunity. Emphasizing the crime of torture, this article explores the legal framework applicable to PMFs, both from a domestic and an international perspective, and sheds light on ways in which these alleged crimes could be investigated, prosecuted, and tried. The Article concludes by questioning the reasons behind the impunity of members of a PMF, even in cases in which their military counterparts were tried and condemned. Keywordscontractors; impunity; international human rights law; international humanitarian law; law of armed conflict; privatized military firms (PMFs); torture[T]orture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . 1 These biases in the way that [privatized military firms] can be contested also mark -or, more adequately, severely limit -any possibility of holding the companies legally accountable. 2

International humanitarian law (IHL) categorically prohibits all types of collective punishment. However, neither treaty nor customary sources provide a clear definition of what should be deemed a collective punishment. Given this lack of clarity, it is no surprise that little attention has been paid to the way in which resorting to different forms of collective punishment during a belligerent occupation might lead to additional violations of international law, including IHL and international human rights law (IHRL). This article explores the notion of collective punishment under the law of occupation and connects it with other relevant rules of international law. Based on this analysis, and using the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a case study, the article argues that violating the prohibition of collective punishment in a situation of belligerent occupation in all likelihood will trigger the breach of other concomitant rules of IHL and IHRL, thus shedding light on the scope of the prohibition contained in Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

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