No abstract

Meghnad Desai of the London School of Economics recently suggested that, rather than 'giving fifty billion dollars of overseas aid', we should simply 'find the poor and give them one dollar a week . . . That would probably do more to relieve poverty than anything else'. Two experiences in Mozambique of simply handing out money show this is possible. Payments to demobilized soldiers over a two year period and single payments to flood victims were of the order of magnitude suggested by Desai. Rural people had no difficulty cashing cheques and used the money prudently. The money stimulated the rural economy and thus had a development impact. Administrative costs were between 5 and 10 per cent, much less than in other aid projects. Using the Mozambique experience, this article concludes by suggesting that Desai's proposed one dollar per person per week could be paid as a family grant bi-monthly, which would keep administrative costs low.

Abstract'In a very real sense, the conditions that spawned the war and inflicted gruesome casualties on Sierra Leone's citizens have not disappeared', warned the International Crisis Group. In this paper we argue that many of those conditions are being recreated. The same old men who were responsible for the war are still in power, both in government and in a reinstated chieftaincy system, and corruption is still endemic, while young people remain jobless and largely uneducated. Further, we argue that the policies of the international community are, perhaps inadvertently, promoting a return to pre-war conditions.

Mozambique's cashew nut production failed to recover after the 1982–92 war, with serious implications for peasant producers and workers in the country's single largest industry. Cashew has the potential to regain its role as a major sector of the Mozambican economy, and this article looks at the fundamental problems relating to the growing and processing of cashew. Next, the article shows how contradictory World Bank‐imposed policies prevented Mozambique from resolving these problems. Cashew shows that World Bank staff sometimes have unchecked power to impose policies on poor countries, with no need to justify their actions. The article concludes by asking if the World Bank can be sole judge of the success of its policies.

Strenuous efforts by donors and lenders over four decades turned Mozambique from a socialist success story into a neoliberal capitalist one. The private sector dominates; a domestic elite dependent on foreign companies has been created. But a secret $2.2 billion arms and fishing boat deal involving Swiss and Russian banks and Mozambican purchases from France, Germany, and Israel, with large profits on all sides, was a step too far down the donor's capitalist road. The IMF cut off its programme and western donors ended budget support.