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The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires audit committees of public companies’ boards of directors to install an anonymous reporting channel to assist in deterring and detecting accounting fraud and control weaknesses. While it is generally accepted that the availability of such a reporting channel may reduce the reporting cost of the observer of a questionable act, there is concern that the addition of such a channel may decrease the overall effectiveness compared to a system employing only non-anonymous reporting options. The rationale underlying this concern involves the would-be reporter’s likelihood of reporting, the seriousness with which the organization treats an anonymous report, and the organization’s ability to thoroughly follow-up the report. Thus, we explore the extent to which the availability of an anonymous reporting channel influences intended use of non-anonymous reporting channels. Further, in response to Sarbanes–Oxley and the environment of financial scandals that led to its passage, many firms are strengthening their internal audit departments, and providing them with greater independence from upper management’s direct control. Accordingly, our examination tests whether the intended use of the internal audit department as an internal reporting channel is greater when the internal audit department is of “highâ€\x9D versus “lowâ€\x9D quality. Finally, the study investigates intended reporting behavior across three different cases (e.g., settings). Results show that the existence of an anonymous channel does reduce the likelihood of reporting to non-anonymous channels, that generally the internal audit department quality does not affect reporting to non-anonymous channels, and that case-setting affects the type of channel to be used. Implications from the study are discussed. Copyright Springer 2007internal audit department quality, questionable acts, reporting intentions,

Many auditors use an audit methodology that requires a strategic risk assessment of their client's business model as a first step for assessing audit risks. This study examines whether the holistic perspective that auditors acquire in making a strategic risk assessment influences the extent to which they adjust account-level risk assessments when they encounter changes in accounts that are inconsistent with information about client operations. Based on halo theory from the performance evaluation literature, we hypothesize that auditors who (1) perform (do not perform) strategic assessment, and (2) develop favorable (unfavorable) strategic risk assessments, are less (more) likely to adjust account-level risk assessments for inconsistent fluctuations. Data from two laboratory experiments using experienced auditors support both hypotheses. Findings suggest that the halo effect generated during strategic assessment influences judgment by altering auditor tolerance for inconsistent fluctuations.

This study is a post-SAS No. 82 replication of Zimbelman (1997) (hereafter Z97), which examined the effect of a separate and explicit fraud-risk assessment as later required by SAS No. 82. Z97 found weak evidence that this requirement would impact auditors' planning judgments. However, because Z97 was conducted before SAS No. 82 was issued, that study was unable to capture the full effect of SAS No. 82 on the audit environment (e.g., related guidance and training, audit policy, and implementation experience). In this study, we compare pre- and post-SAS No. 82 planning judgments and find that post-SAS No. 82 judgments are more sensitive to fraud risk factors. Specifically, we find that post-SAS No. 82 participants are more aware of the need to modify audit plans and are more likely to increase the extent of their audit tests in response to increased fraud risk when compared with the pre-SAS No. 82 participants in Z97. However, we do not find evidence that auditors modify the nature of their planned tests in response to fraud risk either before or after SAS No. 82.

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