With FPGAs now being deployed in the cloud and at the edge, there is a need for scalable design methods that can incorporate the heterogeneity present in the hardware and software components of FPGA systems. Moreover, these FPGA systems need to be maintainable and adaptable to changing workloads while improving accessibility for the application developers. However, current FPGA systems fail to achieve modularity and support for multi-tenancy due to dependencies between system components and the lack of standardised abstraction layers. To solve this, we introduce a modular FPGA operating system – FOS, which adopts a modular FPGA development flow to allow each system component to be changed and be agnostic to the heterogeneity of EDA tool versions, hardware and software layers. Further, to dynamically maximise the utilisation transparently from the users, FOS employs resource-elastic scheduling to arbitrate the FPGA resources in both time and spatial domain for any type of accelerators. Our evaluation on different FPGA boards shows that FOS can provide performance improvements in both single-tenant and multi-tenant environments while substantially reducing the development time and, at the same time, improving flexibility.

This paper presents attacks targeting the FPGAs of AWS F1 instances at the electrical level through power-hammering, where excessive dynamic power is used to crash FPGA instances. We demonstrate different power-hammering attacks that pass all AWS security fences implemented on F1 instances, including the FPGA vendor design rule checks. In addition, we fingerprint the FPGA instances to observe the responsiveness of the instances, which indicates a successful denial-of-service attack. Most importantly, we provide an FPGA virus scanner framework, which was improved to support large datacenter FPGAs for preventing such attacks, including virtually all currently demonstrated side-channel attacks. Our experiments showed that an AWS F1 instance crashes immediately by starting an FPGA design demanding 369W. By using FPGA-fingerprinting, we found that crashed instances are unavailable for about one to over 200 hours.

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