dispelling a myth "Economic development makes democracy possible" asserts the U.S. State Department's Web site, subscribing to a highly influential argument: that poor countries must develop economically before they can democratize. But the historical data prove otherwise. Poor democracies have grown at least as fast as poor autocracies and have significantly outperformed the latter on most indicators of social well-being. They have also done much better at avoiding catastrophes. Dispelling the "development first, democracy later" argument is critical not only because it is wrong but also because it has led to atrocious policies-indeed, policies that have undermined international eªorts to improve the lives of hundreds of millions of people in the developing world. Those who believe that democracy can take hold only once a state has developed economically preach a go-slow approach to promoting democracy. But we and others who believe that countries often remain poor precisely because they retain autocratic political structures believe that a development-first strategy perpetuates a deadly cycle of poverty, conflict, and oppression.

Rising commodity prices in recent years have deepened awareness of the paradox of the resource curse – resource‐rich countries consistently facing high levels of poverty, corruption and instability. There is relatively less recognition of the autocratic roots underlying much of this curse, however. Resource‐rich autocracies, on average, are subject to lower levels of well‐being, higher volatility, a greater propensity for conflict and humanitarian crisis, and more corruption than resource‐rich countries on a democratic path. The resource curse persists because sharp inequalities of power limit opportunities for corrective action. Recognising the governance root to the natural resource curse dictates that remedial strategies for resource‐rich democratisers should differ from those for resource‐rich autocracies. In the latter, effective reform strategies must increase the cost of rent‐seeking by the privileged minority and improve the capacity for collective action among the disadvantaged majority. While resource‐rich autocracies do not rely on international assistance for budgetary support, they generally must tend to reputational and investment concerns. Accordingly, there is an important role for international actors – governmental, civil society organisations and the private sector – to play in reversing the resource curse.

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