To stem the spread of the novel H1N1 virus, U.S. public health officials put forth a variety of recommendations, ranging from practicing social distancing and frequent hand washing at the individual level, to furloughs and continual cleaning of commonly touched surfaces at the level of the organization. Although these steps are amenable to implementation in an office, school or hospital setting, they are nearly impossible to apply in the public transit environment, where large numbers of people remain in close quarters, with no running water and limited opportunities for disinfection. Recognizing the need to offer adequate protection from infection to employees and customers alike, transit officials expressed the need for H1N1-specific training, tailored to industry needs and limitations, to Rutgers University's Center for Transportation Safety, Security and Risk. The resulting course, which was informed through a combination of literature-based and primary research, combined the most current public health data with best practices gleaned from some of the nation's largest transit agencies, in a just-in-time format.

In 1994, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a contract reform program intended to strengthen oversight capabilities and encourage the creation of contract and incentive structures, which would effectively facilitate the treatment of onsite contamination and waste. The remediation and disposal of these legacy wastes is the core of the Department's environmental manage- (GAO, 2005). Numerous explanations have been offered as to why achieving these goals has proven so difficult, many of which have concluded that flawed contracting practices are to blame. This article concludes that the root of the problem is much deeper and that the organizational criticisms aimed at DOE are as much a legacy as the waste itself. Although the focus of this article is on large former nuclear weapons sites, these types of contracting and organizational issues are often found at other government and private complex hazardous waste sites.

A recent survey of state environmental regulators revealed that natural resource injuries caused by oil pollution are a major concern, yet few respondents reported pursuing compensation for damages on a regular basis. It appears that their reluctance is due to the fact that many view natural resource damage assessments (NRDA) as a costly, time-consuming and legally risky undertaking. This article presents a case study of Florida's approach to this type of regulation, which relies on the combination of a standardized arithmetic formula and an interactive GIS. Once compensation is obtained, dollars enter a trust fund from which withdrawals can be made when the balance is sufficient to conduct needed restorations. This approach is suggested as a model for jurisdictions interested in pursuing damages for natural resource injuries because it has proven to be a quick, inexpensive, and defensible mechanism for generating damage estimates, even for small spills. Like any real-world application, Florida's methodology is not perfect, but shortcomings are discussed here in depth and potential solutions presented.

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