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This special issue of the Nonproliferation Review results from a project funded by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, aiming to identify lessons learned from efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) around the world. It contains edited versions of papers presented at a November 2015 workshop at the Washington, DC, offices of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. One section covers crosscutting themes, including the strategic, diplomatic, legal, technical, and inter-and intra-agency dimensions of elimination. The second section discusses lessons learned from work in the former Soviet states, Iraq in the 1990s, Iraq in 2003-04, South Africa, Libya, and Syria. Major observations include that the field lacks institutionalization. There are few standing bodies with funding and responsibility for WMD elimination; each case usually emerges by surprise and has ad hoc character. Different combinations of states and international agencies may be involved, bringing varied authorities and competencies to different operational environments. A generic "checklist" approach accordingly may be best suited to applying past lessons to new missions. Among the few constants are a need for extensive coordination between partners and, where applicable, the WMD possessor, and the importance of cultivating high-level support for the mission, both nationally and internationally. Persistent gaps can be seen in both institutions and capabilities. These include the lack of any standing pre-crisis planning body or forum; a lack of sufficient capabilities for identifying and characterizing WMD, especially biological weapons; a lack of understanding of how to approach the dismantlement of foreign nuclear weapons, if necessary. Without continued investment in destruction technologies and organizations, new gaps are likely to emerge as today's parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention complete the destruction of their chemical-weapons stockpiles. Elimination is comparable to other areas of countering WMD. It would benefit from corresponding levels of attention and resources. KEYWORDSWeapons of mass destruction; elimination; chemical weapons; Syria; Libya; South Africa; former Soviet Union; IraqIn mid-2014, a US-led coalition of states and international organizations completed a remarkable task: eliminating one of the largest remaining chemical-weapons (CW) stockpiles in the world, declared by Syria one year before. This effort concluded a process of elimination that began after the Syrian regime employed CW in a large-scale attack against civilians in Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus controlled by the opposition, in August 2013.

National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences assembled a panel of experts under the sponsorship of the U.S. Navy to assess a controversial Defense Department proposal-rapidly converting 24 Trident II submarinelaunched nuclear ballistic missiles into non-nuclear weapons. By adding conventionally armed missiles to submarines that previously carried only nuclear Tridents, the United States would be able to strike any point on Earth within about an hour of the decision to launch, without resorting to nuclear arms. This "conventional prompt global strike" capability would transform a leg of the nuclear triad from a never-to-be-used strategic deterrent into an active tool in the battle against terrorist organizations and WMD proliferators. Prompt global strike is not a new concept. It has been advocated since the early 1990s; Defense described it as part of the "New Triad" in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review; and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review specifically endorsed the "conventional Trident modification" idea. But legislators from both parties have questioned its merits, noting the inadequacy of intelligence to identify targets reliably on short notice. Opponents also have raised the issue of "nuclear ambiguity"-the unnerving possibility that Russia might misinterpret the flight of a conventional Trident as a nuclear attack and respond accordingly. Therefore, Congress charged the expert panel to consider the broader questions involved in pursuing Trident modification or other alternatives. 1 When the panel issued its final report in August-dubbed "U.S.