A clear legal test for equality is impossible, as it should be. Indeed were the test clear, it could not be for equality. It would have to be for something other than equality — in effect, for inequality. The abstract character of equality is not a new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s first decision under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 recognized equality as “an elusive concept” that “lacks precise definition.”2 Why, then, do judges continue to demand such definition over thirty years later? The answer, at times, is politics. 1 s 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 164, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews].

<p>This paper argues for a multi-variable approach to identifying analogous grounds under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The author begins with a review of Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence to demonstrate how the Court has consistently applied such a multi-variable approach. In the course of that review, he notes the lack of clarity in the core factors considered by the Court, namely, immutability and constructive immutability. Then, the author argues in favour of a multi-variable approach because it is more sensitive to the complexities of identity formation and because it is more effective at recognizing grounds worthy of protection under the Charter.</p>

<p>[Introduction]: "    </p> <p>À tous égards, la carrière de Clément Gascon est remarquable. Admis à la faculté de droit de l’Université McGill immédiatement après ses études collégiales, il y complète son baccalauréat en droit civil en 1981 à l’âge de 21 ans. Il intègre les rangs du Barreau du Québec l’année suivante et se joint au réputé cabinet d’avocats Heenan Blaikie à Montréal, où il œuvrera pendant près de 21 ans. Il se distingue rapidement pour ses grandes qualités personnelles et professionnelles, ainsi que pour son expertise en droit du travail et en litige commercial, notamment en matière d’insolvabilité. Ses collègues lui font confiance à plusieurs reprises pour les représenter tant au Comité exécutif national et au Comité de gestion national du cabinet, de 1994 à 2002, qu’à titre d’associé responsable du secteur du contentieux, de 1994 à 1999. Mentor hors pair pour ses plus jeunes collègues, il enseigne aussi plusieurs cours à l’Université du Québec à Montréal, à l’Université McGill, et à l’École du Barreau du Québec. "</p>

<p>A clear legal test for equality is impossible, as it should be. Indeed were the test clear, it could not be for equality. It would have to be for something other than equality — in effect, for inequality. The abstract character of equality is not a new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s first decision under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognized equality as “an elusive concept” that “lacks precise definition.” Why, then, do judges continue to demand such definition over thirty years later? The answer, at times, is politics.</p>

<p>This article explores two disability justice legacies of Justice Clément Gascon. One legacy is embodied in his personal narrative of disability. Another legacy is jurisprudential and seen in his legal reasoning. On his embodied legacy, the article juxtaposes Justice Gascon’s widely publicized anxiety attack with Justice Le Dain’s private forced resignation following his hospitalization for depression thirty years earlier. This comparison reveals how, in many ways, attitudes around disability have not progressed, but rather reconfigured into more palatable forms. And on his jurisprudential legacy, this article conducts a critical disability theory analysis of Justice Gascon’s dissent in Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. In so doing, it highlights the ideological undercurrents that shape Canadian law, the link between ableism in society and ableism on the Court, and the importance of incorporating disability in contemporary discourse around judicial diversity.</p>