Feeding deterrent activities of twelve clerodane diterpenoids towards Tenebrio molitor (Coleoptera: Tenebrionidae) larvae have been correlated using molecular connectivity indexes (3χc, 4χc, °ΔX) and hydrophobicity constants (log K′w) obtained by reverse‐phase liquid chromatography (RPLC). The equations obtained suggest that both the degree of branching and the electronic characteristics of the compounds under study have a dominant role in the observed antifeedant activity. The information obtained from the correlations should be useful in designing more potent analogues.

In this paper we introduce two related core-type solutions for games with transferable utility (TU-games) the B-core and the M-core. The elements of the solutions are pairs (x, B), where x, as usual, is a vector representing a distribution of utility and B is a balanced family of coalitions, in the case of the B-core, and a minimal balanced one, in the case of the M-core, describing a plausible organization of the players to achieve the vector x. Both solutions extend the notion of classical core but, unlike it, they are always nonempty for any TU-game. For the M-core, which also exhibits a certain kind of "minimality" property, we provide a nice axiomatic characterization in terms of the four axioms nonemptiness (NE), individual rationality (IR), superadditivity (SUPA) and a weak reduced game property (WRGP) (with appropriate modifications to adapt them to the new framework) used to characterize the classical core. However, an additional axiom, the axiom of equal opportunity is required. It roughly states that if (x, B) belongs to the M-core then, any other admissible element of the form (x, B ) should belong to the solution too.

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TU-games, Transfer scheme, Cycles, Non-balanced games, Characterization,