ResumenLa noción de clase creativa y su interpretación de la creatividad, elaboradas por Richard Florida (2002), han abierto una importante vía de investigación y controversia en el panorama sociológico internacional. En este artículo aplicamos sus mediciones al caso de España calculando los tres indicadores que construyen la creatividad (tecnología, talento y tolerancia), cada uno de los cuales está compuesto de tres subíndices. Los datos que ofrecemos están desagregados por comunidades autónomas y provincias. PalabRas ClaveTalento; Tecnología; Tolerancia. abstRaCtThe notion of the Creative Class and its interpretation of creativity, developed by Richard Florida (2002), have opened an important avenue of research and controversy in the international sociological scene. In this paper, we apply Florida's measurements to the case of Spain by measuring the three indicators that build creativity (technology, talent and tolerance), each of which is also composed of three sub-indicators. The data are disaggregated by regions and provinces.

In this paper the factors that facilitate or impede the creation of cooperative companies are analyzed, and specifically the worker cooperatives. The paper centres in Spain on the period 2000-2009. It consists basically of three parts: firstly, a brief review of the literature, secondly, a brief description of the situation of the cooperativism in Spain and, finally, the application of a model who tries to evaluate the influence of the commented factors.

The objective of this paper is exploring the possibilities to reduce economic inequality through fiscal policy. The empirical analyses focuses on the period 2007-2014 and the OECD countries. Our quantitative analyses is based on data from OECD dataset and offers the following results. On the one side, the most redistributive capacity corresponds to taxes; and on the other side, that the most redistributive transfers are family transfers, pensions and unemployment subsidies.

RESUMENEn este trabajo se analiza la relación de empleo en una empresa capitalista convencional. Su punto de partida es el carácter de información privada que tiene el desempeño del empleado. Esto hace que la relación contractual entre el empresario y el trabajador conlleve un problema relativo al esfuerzo que el trabajador dedica a la empresa. En el presente trabajo se estudian dos posibles soluciones a dicho problema: la supervisión por parte del empresario y la participación en los ingresos de la empresa por parte del trabajador, comparando ambas soluciones con la de first-best. La principal conclusión de nuestro análisis es la superioridad técnica de la empresa participativa sobre la jerárquica debido al ahorro en gastos de supervisión.Palabras clave: relación de empleo, información oculta, supervisión, empresa democrática. businessman and the worker creates a problem relative to the effort that the worker dedicates to the company. In this paper two possible alternative solutions are studied: supervision on the part of the businessman and the participation in company revenue on the part of the worker, comparing both solutions with the first-best. The main conclusion of our analysis is the technical superiority of the participative company over the hierarchic one due to the saving in supervising expenses.

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