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This book focuses on the law and politics of rights protection in democracies, and in human rights regimes in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. After introducing the basic features of modern constitutions, with their emphasis on rights and judicial review, the authors present a theory of proportionality that explains why constitutional judges embraced it. Proportionality analysis is a highly intrusive mode of judicial supervision: it permits state officials to limit rights, but only when necessary to achieve a sufficiently important public interest. Since the 1950s, virtually every powerful domestic and international court has adopted proportionality as the central method for protecting rights. In doing so, judges positioned themselves to review all important legislative and administrative decisions, and to invalidate them as unconstitutional when they fail the proportionality test. The result has been a massive—and global—transformation of law and politics. The book explicates the concepts of “trusteeship,” the “system of constitutional justice,” the “effectiveness” of rights adjudication, and the “zone of proportionality.” A wide range of case studies analyze: how proportionality has spread, and variation in how it is deployed; the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court has evolved and resisted similar doctrines; the role of proportionality in building ongoing “constitutional dialogues” with the other branches of government; and the importance of the principle to the courts of regional human rights regimes. While there is variance in the intensity of proportionality-based dialogues, such interactions are today at the heart of governance in the modern constitutional state and beyond.

This paper offers a theory to explain cross-national variation in

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The chapter explains why enforcement of the proportionality principle has become the central procedural component of constitutional governance in the world today. Part I argues that proportionality analysis [PA]—with its distinctive sequence of subtests culminating in balancing—neatly fits the structure of qualified rights, providing a comprehensive analytical framework for adjudicating them. A right’s provision is “qualified” when it contains a limitation clause, which authorizes government officials to restrict the enjoyment of a right for some sufficiently important public purpose. Today, virtually all of the most powerful courts in the world deploy PA to determine whether officials have properly exercised their authority under limitation clauses. PA proceeds through a sequence of subtests: (i) “legitimacy,” or “proper purpose”; (ii) “suitability” or “rational connection”; (iii) “necessity”; and (iv) “proportionality in the strict sense.” A government measure that fails any subtest in this sequence is unlawful. Part II directs attention to the various ways in which proportionality enables judges to manage legitimacy issues associated with the judicial supremacy that comes with trusteeship. PA enables judges: to avoid creating rigid hierarchies among rights and interests; to exploit the legitimizing logics of Pareto optimality (reducing harm to the loser as much as possible); and to identify and respect the lawmaking prerogatives of the officials whose policymaking they supervise. Part III develops a simple model of constitutional governance—with rights, a duty of officials to justify their rights-regarding actions, and PA at its core—and respond to objections and alternatives.