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This article examines the validity of an objective measure of partisan ambivalence. More generally, it draws attention to the idea that measurement is an active step taken by the researcher and therefore should be subjected to empirical examination. It is also argued that treating a variable at a higher level of measurement than warranted will cause a valid measure to cease to be so, and that the appropriate level of a variable is determined not by the underlying concept or the measurement procedure, but by the researcher. I demonstrate the measure examined can distinguish between various attitudinal states, but only at the nominal level. This is largely driven by individuals who offer no responses to open-ended questions, who are termed indifferent. Furthermore, different coding schemes result in different conclusions. For example, the finding that indifferent individuals are less likely to rely on partisanship than ambivalent individuals when evaluating candidates is obscured when treating the measure as interval. The findings suggest the measure should be coded to account for indifferent individuals, and that even well developed measures of clearly defined concepts need to be subjected to empirical examination. KEY WORDS: partisan ambivalence, partisan indifference, measurement, ALSOSThe measurement of key concepts is a subject of interest to methodologists and substantive researchers alike. The spotlight is justified: different measures of the same concept often lead to different conclusions; indeed, different coding of the same measure can be enough to alter conclusions. In particular, this article deals with an objective measure of partisan ambivalence and examines the appropriate level of measurement and how different coding schemes result in different substantive conclusions. More broadly, the article draws attention to the idea that measurement is an active step taken by the researcher. Thinking about measurement this way illuminates the fact that how one decides to measure a concept and code a variable are decisions that can influence results in exactly the same way that

It has long been argued that elections amplify partisan predispositions. We take advantage of the timing of the cross-national post-election surveys included in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems to explore the effects that elections have on individuals’ attachments to political parties. Within these surveys, under the assumption that the dates on which respondents are interviewed are assigned independent of factors known to affect partisanship, we are able to identify the causal effects of election salience on partisan attachments. We find strong evidence that election salience increases the probability of one having a party attachment, increases the strength of attachments, and heightens the relationship between partisanship and evaluations of political actors. Empirical explorations of our identifying assumption bolster its validity. Our results substantiate the causal role that elections play in activating partisanship.

Compulsory rules are known to have far‐reaching effects beyond boosting electoral participation rates. This article examines the relationship between compulsory voting and partisan attachments. A theory of attachment formation and strength is engaged that argues that compulsory voting boosts the likelihood that one will identify with a party and, in turn, the strength of party attachments among identifiers. The statistical model accounts for both the hierarchical structure of the data (individuals in elections) and the dual nature of the dependent variable (individuals report a strength of attachment only for the party with which they identify). Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, it is demonstrated that compulsory voting does indeed increase both the incidence and the strength of partisanship.