A remarkable difference in the understanding of the symbolic relation between a scale model and the larger space that it represented was displayed by two age groups of young children. Three-year-old children who observed an object being hidden in a model knew where to find an analogous object hidden in the corresponding location in a room, but 2.5-year-old children did not. The success of the group of older children reveals an advance in their cognitive flexibility: they think of a model in two ways at the same time--both as the thing itself and as a symbol for something else.

In the first few years of life, children acquire a great deal of general information through symbolic media, including television. Here we explored whether very young children would use information presented via video to solve a retrieval problem. The children watched on a monitor as a toy was hidden in the room next door. A group of 2%-year-olds was very successful at finding the hidden toy based on the televised hiding event, but a group of 2-year-olds was not. Substantially better performance was achieved by other 2-year-olds who either watched the hiding event directly through a window or who believed they were watching directly (but were in fact looking at the monitor through the window). These results (like those from other symbolic media such as models and pictures) indicate that very young children have difficulty using a symbolic representation as a source of information about an existing situation.

To use a symbolic object such as a model, map, or picture, one must achieve dual representation; that is, one must mentally represent both the symbol itself and its relation to its referent. The studies reported here confirm predictions derived from this concept. As hypothesized, dual representation was as difficult for 2 1/2-year-olds to achieve with a set of individual objects as it was with an integrated model. Decreasing the physical salience of a scale model (by placing it behind a window) made it easier for 2 1/2-year-old children to treat it as a representation of something other than itself. Conversely, increasing the model's salience as an object (by allowing 3-year-old children to manipulate it) made it more difficult to appreciate its symbolic import. The results provide strong support for dual representation.

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