Much recent work on concepts has been inspired by and is developed within the bounds of the representational theory of the mind often taken for granted by philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, and psychologists alike (see e.g. Margolis and Laurence 1999; Stich and Warfield 1994). The contributions to this volume take a more encompassing perspective on the issue of concepts. Rather than modelling details of our representational architecture in line with the dominant paradigm, they explore three traditional issues concerning concepts. Inquiring into how language and the mind are interrelated, Brandom, Bermúdez, Nida-Rümelin and Racokzy ask:
Is mastery of a language necessary for thought?Pondering whether drawing on concepts to explain our thinking requires us to adopt the representational paradigm of the mind in the first place, Kenny, Glock, and Saporiti are concerned with the question: Do concepts reduce to abilities?Finally, in order to assess the prospects for philosophical reliance on conceptual analysis, Jackson, Nimtz, Spicer, and Textor discuss: Is the analysis of concepts a viable means to ascertain truths from the proverbial armchair?Needless to say, there is no consensus to be had on either issue.This introductory essay explores the backdrop to the debate our authors engage in. We will provide a rough geography of key ideas and issues shaping the overall debate on concepts within contemporary philosophy. We will proceed in two steps. In a first step, we will present and discuss key ideas shaping the assumptions and expectations concerning concepts philosophers harbour ( §1). Taken together, they form what we want to think of as the conventional picture of concepts. In a second step, we will focus on recent developments and divisive fundamental issues that have brought about tectonic changes in the philosophical views on concepts ( §2). These explain why the conventional picture has gone basically out of fashion and why the philosophical debate on concepts in general appears heterogeneous, and feels fragmented.
Concepts in philosophy: some traditional ideasIn line with well-known instructive attempts to characterize the nature and role of concepts (see Fodor 1998, ch. 1, Margolis and Laurence 1999b, and especially Burge 1993), we present a list of popular ideas concerning concepts. Although items from our list are often presented as platitudes, we hold that it neither catalogues mere truisms, nor states a general consensus.
The list rather registers key ideas as to what concept are, and what conceptsdo, that figure prominently in the contemporary debate. Apparently, few contemporary philosophers subscribe to the conventional picture of concepts in its entirety. As we shall see in §2, many philosophers embrace fundamental views about thought, language, and content which lead them to reinterpret or reject core ideas of the conventional picture.Talk of 'concepts' looms large in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, and it plays an important role in epistemology. These disciplines,...
