This paper argues that firms have particular institutional capabilities that allow them to protect knowledge from expropriation and imitation more effectively than market contracting. I argue that it is these generalized institutional capabilities that allow firms to generate and protect the unique resources and capabilities that are central to the strategic theory of the firm.

This paper examines the organizational arrangements used by New Biotechnology Firms (NBFs) to source scientific knowledge. Using data from two highly successful NBFs, the paper shows that both firms relied principally on hierarchies and networks to source scientific knowledge; market arrangements were insignificant. Most interesting, each firm had a very large, diversified set of boundary-spanning collaborative research arrangements, mostly involving university scientists. It is argued that these external research networks enabled the two firms studied to compete more successfully in a highly turbulent and highly competitive industry environment.

This paper investigates the causes and consequences of activist block share purchases in the 1980s. We find that activist investors were most likely to purchase large blocks of shares in highly diversified firms with poor profitability. Activists were not less likely to purchase blocks in firms with shark repellents and employee stock ownership plans. Activist block purchases were followed by increases in asset divestitures, decreases in mergers and acquisitions, and abnormal share price appreciation. Industry-adjusted operating profitability also rose. This evidence supports the view that the market for partial corporate control plays an important role in limiting agency costs in U.S. corporations.

c This paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and corporate restructuring in a sample of 93 surviving public Fortune 500 firnu during the period 1981-87. The results show that blockholder ownership is associated sign$cantly with corporate restructuring, suggesting that many managers restructured their corporations during the 1980s only when pressured to do so by large shareholders.