T IS about three-quarters of a century since the early anthropologists and I sociologists attempted to formulate cultural regularities in generalized or scientific terms. The specific evolutionary formulations of such writers as Morgan' and Tylor2 and the functional or sociological formulations of Durkheim and others were largely repudiated by the 20th century anthropologists, especially by those of the so-called "Boas" school, whose field wQrk tested and cast doubt on their validity. Today, despite an enormous and ever-increasing stock-pile of cultural data, little effort has been made to devise new formulations or even to develop a methodology for doing so, except as White and Childe have kept alive the tradition of Morgan, as Radcliffe-Brown and Redfield have continued in the spirit of Durkheim, and as Malinowski has attempted to reconcile diverse schools of anthropology through a "scientific theory of culture."Reaction to evolutionism and scientific functionalism has very nearly amounted to a denial that regularities exist; that is, to a claim that history never repeats itself. While it is theoretically admitted that cause and effect operate in cultural phenomena, it is considered somewhat rash to mention causality, let alone "law," in specific cases. Attention is centered on cultural differences, particulars, and peculiarities, and culture is often treated as if it developed quixotically, without determinable causes, or else appeared fullblown.I t is unfortunate that the two approaches are so widely thought of as theoretically irreconcilable rather than as expressions of different purposes or interests. The 19th century writers had the perfectly legitimate purpose of making scientific generalizations from what they considered recurrent cultural patterns, sequences, and processes in different cultures, while the more recent school has the equally legitimate purpose of examining the distinctive or nonrecurrent features of cultures. As all cultures, though unique in many respects, Morgan, 1877.9 Tylor, 1865,1871.

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This is the second in a series of symposia the object of which is to expedite scholarly intercommunication. Robert Braidwood's query was referred to several colleagues for comments which were sent to Braidwood for rejoinder; then the series was edited as a whole. Similar queries in any field of anthropology, or at the margins, are invited, and the author may suggest names of persons whose comments he would value. QUERY by ROBERT J. BRAIDWOOD

In recent years considerable attention has been given to theoretical statements and to concrete applications of what is called the “taxonomic method“ in archaeology. Although this method is not necessarily in conflict with the direct historical approach to archaeology, a growing preoccupation with the former has definitely been at the expense of the latter. The direct historical approach, although employed more or less for many years, has not received formulation comparable to that of the taxonomic method, nor have its potentialities for planned research programs and its possible integration with recent types of historical ethnographic research received full recognition. Even, therefore, if it is unnecessary to argue its value, it seems timely to attempt a statement that may help clarify its procedures and research possibilities.

Cultural anthropology is generally considered to be a distinctive discipline which seeks an understanding of the fundamental nature of culture and of culture change. The nature of its ultimate objectives, however, is rarely made explicit, and a lack of agreement exists concerning even the more immediate objectives. There is reason to believe that within the last few years archaeology and ethnology are, in many respects, growing rapidly apart instead of contributing to mutual problems. It seems timely, therefore, to inquire whether there really exists a general, basic problem of culture and to what extent archaeological research may be brought to bear upon it.