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This article traces the recent development of gender equality law, understood broadly to embrace sex, transsexual and sexual orientation discrimination. Against this background it considers the 'problem' of religion from two perspectives. First, religion is seen as representing a problematic obstacle to the pursuit of a modern gender equality programme, and this results in judicial tendencies to criticise religion and constrain its significance. Second, religions and religious bodies themselves have difficulties with the new ethic underlying recent legal changes. The tension between religious ethics and the new law has resulted in a series of exceptions for religious bodies. However, these are rather narrow, and can be viewed as the minimum necessary to satisfy international and European human rights standards. The article then considers the enigma of equality and the question-begging nature of much of the law made in its name. It concludes that modern problems are better seen not as a clash between religious liberty and gender equality, but as a shift in conceptions of equality. At the same time, this shift has been accompanied by a significant juridification of what for a long time have been social spaces virtually immune from secular legal regulation. Ironically, a new establishment is being created which barely tolerates dissenters.

This article challenges the assumption that the burden of demonstrating that a limitation of a fundamental right is proportionate rests on the public authority seeking to justify the limitation. After considering the operation of burdens and presumptions in European human rights case-law it notes the difficulties British domestic courts have had in rigorously applying proportionality tests. It suggests that the concerns which lead judges to weaken the requirement of proportionality would be better met by recognising that certain circumstances give rise to a presumption of proportionality, where the burden of demonstrating disproportionality rests on the right-holder. Five categories of case in which this applies are proposed, and one which has recently been judicially accepted is rejected. Clarifying the types of case in which a presumption of proportionality applies is a preferable strategy to blurring the standards of justification to be met by those seeking to limit the enjoyment of rights. 1 *Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Bristol Law School.

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In the last decade, the religious dimensions and significance of the European Union have been increasingly recognised. This paper sets out the role and regulation of religious associations within European law. Although it is often assumed that European competence does not touch on matters of religion, a jurisdictional separation of ‘economics’ and ‘religion’ has been increasingly hard to sustain. European law grants various privileges and exemptions to religious bodies. However, the dominant model to emerge is one of pluralism: distinctive substantive legal regimes applicable to religious bodies, and a distinctive participatory position within the governance of the European Union. However, the paper suggests that the pursuit of pluralism has not been entirely successful National diversity in this field coupled with the sheer complexity of achieving a reasonable balance of competing interests conspire to make it remarkably elusive. What is needed is a greater recognition of the right of States to adjust European legal requirements to accommodate the legitimate needs of the religious bodies within their jurisdiction and a renewed commitment to producing workable solutions in dialogue with religious associations.