Purpose -The purpose of this research is to use an accountability framework to explain the emerging tensions in accountability and how an intended bottom-up approach became progressively supplanted. This paper is set within an emerging Zambian microfinance organisation moving into crisis. Design/methodology/approach -A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with key local microfinance specialists, managers and accountants, clients and past and current loan officers. Live observation of the client-loan officer interface and internal meetings provided triangulation on accountability relationships in the midst of crisis. Data were analysed using NVIVO, a qualitative computer software package. Findings -The findings show that tensions between vertical and horizontal accountability in practice can be directly translated into heightened pressure and stresses on both the non-governmental organisation (NGO) and its loan officers, which constrain overall accountabilities to other stakeholders and disguise other potential dysfunctions.Research limitations/implications -This study focussed on accountability at the grassroots in microfinance NGOs with a social mission. It reveals potential for further personal, community and socially constituted accounting research within microfinance in particular. Originality/value -The paper adds to the literature on NGO accountability. It will be of value to researchers and practitioners seeking to gain a better understanding of not-for-profit organisations whose goals are not primarily wealth creation. It also gives details on under-researched areas in accounting, namely NGOs and poverty reduction, and practices in Sub-Saharan Africa.

(2007) 'Loan ocers and loan 'delinquency' in micronance : a Zambian case.', Accounting forum., 31 (1). pp. 47-71. Further information on publisher's website:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor. 2006.11.005 Publisher's copyright statement:Additional information: Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. ABSTRACTThe paper seeks to correct the neglected importance of loan officers in microfinance by explaining their roles, dilemmas and tensions when actually working with clients. Few existing studies have used data outside Bangladesh and many focus upon well-performing institutions. This study draws its data from Zambia and focuses on the recent repayment crisis of CETZAM and the effects of strategies for dealing with defaulters. Our findings firstly show that loan officers faced powerful hierarchical accountability pressures and under intense pressure, used inappropriate methods to compel repayments. Second, because of their problematic relationships with clients, loan officers experienced job-related tensions through performing conflicting roles that called for a particular management of emotions. Third, the approach to borrower default is shown to be so detrimental for CETZAM"s short and longterm survival that it could call other developments into question.

The exclusion of the poor in developing countries requires radical enterprising solutions. Hence, microfinance was originally developed to intermediate through tailored double-bottom line initiatives, which would first supply more appropriate credit and, then other 'financial services', in an essentially participatory, 'bottom-up' way. This would support local, small-scale economic activity while enhancing well-being and social/gender justice. However, frontline local officers, originally recruited into microfinance institutions to help 'empower' the poor towards this end, have in practice been found to adopt unexpectedly different roles. Using original data from Zambia this article examines how this occurred in a frontier field situation. Here loan officers performed multiple, ambiguous and changeable roles while their home institution at first sought to decouple, and then prioritized its own immediate survival over their other founding aspirations. Where they acted more like 'loan repayment agents' and 'debt collectors' than genuinely participative 'facilitators' supporting the poor, further, unintended consequences resulted. Any further decoupling and retreat from committed double-bottom line working could bear heavily upon the further/future development prospects of microfinance.

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This study examines the effect of regulations on microfinance institutions in Nigeria and Zambia by focusing on the post-regulation experiences and reflections of the microfinance institutions (MFIs) and their regulators. Based on in-depthinterviews with the Central Banks as regulators, MFI managers, practitioners and apex microfinance associations, the study finds that regulations in both countries have managed to professionalize the sector, but their effectiveness in augmenting the centrality of social goals to microfinance and MFIs remains doubtful. The poorly designed regulations are not only undermining social goals but also sending wrong signals to would be social investors, with implications for the social image of the industry. The study further finds that regulations have neither speeded the emergence of sustainable MFIs (especially in Zambia) nor accelerated the sectors' outreach to the poor and the financially excluded. Additionally, considerable levels of political interference and poor regulation have led to unintended consequences to the sector, further frustrating the ultimate goal of extending financial services to the poor. These findings have policy and practical implications for how microfinance engages with the regulatory logic and continues to serve those at the bottom of the pyramid.