Vertical integration theory has long suggested internal costs related to changes in incentives due to vertical integration, which means that vertical integration may lead to agency costs. In this work, we specify the notion of agency costs of vertical integration and extend Ang et al. (2000)'s measurement of agency costs to provide an empirical assessment of these costs in the French wine industry. Our econometric analysis finds that the agency costs of vertical integration may reach 2-3% of sales. It also showed that operating expenses of vertical integration are lower for cooperatives than for other firms, while vertical integration is less rewarding for them. This raises questions on the relation between agency costs in cooperatives and their performance.JEL classifications: G320, D230, Q130

In this article, we investigate a possible conflict between two core objectives of cooperatives, members’ income, and continuity, by examining the link between debt and the price paid to producers for Bordeaux wine cooperatives, according to their downstream strategies: (1) the traditional strategy, which is to sell wine in bulk to négociants; (2) joining a federation of cooperatives which blends and puts the wine in the retail market; and (3) vertical integration. We show that downstream strategies are related to different lending regimes, making the relationship between banks and cooperatives a key issue for the lifecycle of cooperatives. (JEL Classifications: D230, G320, Q130)

No abstract

The present study aims to learn how collateral affects firm performance in the case of newly established wine producers. The issue is to identify the effects of collateral in situations of asymmetric information when the bank is the main financial partner of the entrepreneurs involved. On the one hand, the use of collateral may reduce the risk of overinvestment by entrepreneurs and thereby reduce the risk of repayment default. On the other hand, collateral may induce bad performance linked to a reduced monitoring of the investments by the bank. We herein test both hypotheses in two different cases: when the bank monitors the investments and when the bank does not.

No abstract