Voluntary motor commands produce two kinds of consequences. Initially, a sensory consequence is observed in terms of activity in our primary sensory organs (e.g., vision, proprioception). Subsequently, the brain evaluates the sensory feedback and produces a subjective measure of utility or usefulness of the motor commands (e.g., reward). As a result, comparisons between predicted and observed consequences of motor commands produce two forms of prediction error. How do these errors contribute to changes in motor commands? Here, we considered a reach adaptation protocol and found that when high quality sensory feedback was available, adaptation of motor commands was driven almost exclusively by sensory prediction errors. This form of learning had a distinct signature: as motor commands adapted, the subjects altered their predictions regarding sensory consequences of motor commands, and generalized this learning broadly to neighboring motor commands. In contrast, as the quality of the sensory feedback degraded, adaptation of motor commands became more dependent on reward prediction errors. Reward prediction errors produced comparable changes in the motor commands, but produced no change in the predicted sensory consequences of motor commands, and generalized only locally. Because we found that there was a within subject correlation between generalization patterns and sensory remapping, it is plausible that during adaptation an individual's relative reliance on sensory vs. reward prediction errors could be inferred. We suggest that while motor commands change because of sensory and reward prediction errors, only sensory prediction errors produce a change in the neural system that predicts sensory consequences of motor commands.

When we use a novel tool, the motor commands may not produce the expected outcome. In healthy individuals, with practice the brain learns to alter the motor commands. This change depends critically on the cerebellum as damage to this structure impairs adaptation. However, it is unclear precisely what the cerebellum contributes to the process of adaptation in human motor learning. Is the cerebellum crucial for learning to associate motor commands with novel sensory consequences, called forward model, or is the cerebellum important for learning to associate sensory goals with novel motor commands, called inverse model? Here, we compared performance of cerebellar patients and healthy controls in a reaching task with a gradual perturbation schedule. This schedule allowed both groups to adapt their motor commands. Following training, we measured two kinds of behavior: in one case people were presented with reach targets near the direction in which they had trained. The resulting generalization patterns of patients and controls were similar, suggesting comparable inverse models. In another case, they reached without a target and reported the location of their hand. In controls the pattern of change in reported hand location was consistent with simulation results of a forward model that had learned to associate motor commands with new sensory consequences. In patients, this change was significantly smaller. Therefore, in our sample of patients we observed that while adaptation of motor commands can take place despite cerebellar damage, cerebellar integrity appears critical for learning to predict visual sensory consequences of motor commands.

Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) exhibit deficits in motor control, imitation, and social function. Does a dysfunction in the neural basis of representing internal models of action contribute to these problems? We measured patterns of generalization as children learned to control a novel tool and found that the autistic brain built a stronger than normal association between self generated motor commands and proprioceptive feedback; furthermore, the greater the reliance on proprioception, the greater the child’s impairments in social function and imitation.