The complex dynamical behavior of a finance system is investigated in this paper. The RuelleTakens route to chaos and strange nonchaotic attractors (SNA) are found through numerical simulations. Then the system with time-delayed feedback is considered and the stability and Hopf bifurcation of the controlled system are investigated. This research has important theoretical and practical meanings.

In this paper, a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer is discussed. The manufacturer sells its products to its customers, becoming the rival of the retailers. In this case, we consider two scenarios in which the manufacturer holds either asymmetric or symmetric channel power as the retailer. According to the changing demand, we develop the dynamic game models for the two scenarios and analyze the models' dynamic behavior. The corporations' profits and system stability are compared under these two scenarios. We find that the manufacturer's profit is greater with asymmetric channel power than that with symmetric channel power. For the retailer, it will get more profit if it holds a symmetric channel power compared with the manufacturer. The supply chain profit will increase as the internal competition increases. Besides, the system stability will be easier to maintain with asymmetric channel power and the market will be much easier to fall into chaos with symmetric channel power.

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