Human resources for health (HRH) play a central role in improving accessibility to services and quality of care. Their motivation influences this. In Mali, operational research was conducted to identify the match between motivation and the range and use of performance management activities.ObjectivesTo describe the factors motivating and demotivating health workers in Mali and match the motivators with the implementation of performance management.MethodsFirst an exploratory qualitative study was conducted: 28 interviews and eight group discussions were held. This was followed by a cross-sectional survey, during which 370 health workers were interviewed. The study population consisted of health workers of eight professional groups. The following issues were investigated:• motivating and demotivating factors;• experiences with performance management, including: job descriptions, continuous education, supervision, performance appraisal and career development.FindingsThe study showed that the main motivators of health workers were related to responsibility, training and recognition, next to salary. These can be influenced by performance management (job descriptions, supervisions, continuous education and performance appraisal). Performance management is not optimally implemented in Mali, as job descriptions were not present or were inappropriate; only 13% of interviewees received 4× per year supervision, and training needs were not analysed. Some 48% of the interviewees knew their performance had been appraised in the last two years; the appraisals were perceived as subjective. No other methods were in place to show recognition. The results enabled the research team to propose adaptations or improvements upon existing performance management.ConclusionThe results showed the importance of adapting or improving upon performance management strategies to influence staff motivation. This can be done by matching performance management activities to motivators identified by operational research.

BackgroundPerformance-based financing is increasingly being applied in a variety of contexts, with the expectation that it can improve the performance of health systems. However, while there is a growing literature on implementation issues and effects on outputs, there has been relatively little focus on interactions between PBF and health systems and how these should be studied. This paper aims to contribute to filling that gap by developing a framework for assessing the interactions between PBF and health systems, focusing on low and middle income countries. In doing so, it elaborates a general framework for monitoring and evaluating health system reforms in general.MethodsThis paper is based on an exploratory literature review and on the work of a group of academics and PBF practitioners. The group developed ideas for the monitoring and evaluation framework through exchange of emails and working documents. Ideas were further refined through discussion at the Health Systems Research symposium in Beijing in October 2012, through comments from members of the online PBF Community of Practice and Beijing participants, and through discussion with PBF experts in Bergen in June 2013.ResultsThe paper starts with a discussion of definitions, to clarify the core concept of PBF and how the different terms are used. It then develops a framework for monitoring its interactions with the health system, structured around five domains of context, the development process, design, implementation and effects. Some of the key questions for monitoring and evaluation are highlighted, and a systematic approach to monitoring effects proposed, structured according to the health system pillars, but also according to inputs, processes and outputs.ConclusionsThe paper lays out a broad framework within which indicators can be prioritised for monitoring and evaluation of PBF or other health system reforms. It highlights the dynamic linkages between the domains and the different pillars. All of these are also framed within inter-sectoral and wider societal contexts. It highlights the importance of differentiating short term and long term effects, and also effects (intended and unintended) at different levels of the health system, and for different sectors and areas of the country. Outstanding work will include using and refining the framework and agreeing on the most important hypotheses to test using it, in relation to PBF but also other purchasing and provider payment reforms, as well as appropriate research methods to use for this task.

BackgroundSocial accountability has been emphasised as an important strategy to increase the quality, equity, and responsiveness of health services. In many countries, health facility committees (HFCs) provide the accountability interface between health providers and citizens or users of health services. This article explores the social accountability practices facilitated by HFCs in Benin, Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo.MethodsThe paper is based on a cross-case comparison of 11 HFCs across the three countries. The HFCs were purposefully selected based on the (past) presence of community participation support programs. The cases were derived from qualitative research involving document analysis as well as interviews and focus group discussions with health workers, citizens, committee members, and local authorities.ResultsMost HFCs facilitate social accountability by engaging with health providers in person or through meetings to discuss service failures, leading to changes in the quality of services, such as improved health worker presence, the availability of night shifts, the display of drug prices and replacement of poorly functioning health workers. Social accountability practices are however often individualised and not systematic, and their success depends on HFC leadership and synergy with other community structures. The absence of remuneration for HFC members does not seem to affect HFC engagement in social accountability.ConclusionsMost HFCs in this study offer a social accountability forum, but the informal and non-systematic character and limited community consultation leave opportunities for the exclusion of voices of marginalised groups. More inclusive, coherent and authoritative social accountability practices can be developed by making explicit the mandate of HFC in the planning, monitoring, and supervision of health services; providing instruments for organising local accountability processes; strengthening opportunities for community input and feedback; and strengthening links to formal administrative accountability mechanisms in the health system.

BackgroundPerformance based financing (PBF) has been increasingly implemented across low and middle-income countries, including in fragile and humanitarian settings, which present specific features likely to require adaptation and to influence implementation of any health financing programme. However, the literature has been surprisingly thin in the discussion of how PBF has been adapted to different contexts, and in turn how different contexts may influence PBF. With case studies from three humanitarian settings (northern Nigeria, Central African Republic and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo), we examine why and how PBF has emerged and has been adapted to those unsettled and dynamic contexts, what the opportunities and challenges have been, and what lessons can be drawn.MethodsOur comparative case study is based on data collected from a document review, 35 key informant interviews and 16 focus group discussions with stakeholders at national and subnational level in the three settings. Data were analysed in order to describe and compare each setting in terms of underlying fragility features and their implications for the health system, and to look at how PBF has been adopted, implemented and iteratively adapted to respond to acute crisis, deal with other humanitarian actors and involve local communities.ResultsOur analysis reveals that the challenging environments required a high degree of PBF adaptation and innovation, at times contravening the so-called ‘PBF principles’ that have become codified. We develop an analytical framework to highlight the key nodes where adaptations happen, the contextual drivers of adaptation, and the organisational elements that facilitate adaptation and may sustain PBF programmes.ConclusionsOur study points to the importance of pragmatic adaptation in PBF design and implementation to reflect the contextual specificities, and identifies elements (such as, organisational flexibility, local staff and knowledge, and embedded long-term partners) that could facilitate adaptations and innovations. These findings and framework are useful to spark a reflection among PBF donors and implementers on the relevance of incorporating, reinforcing and building on those elements when designing and implementing PBF programmes.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (10.1186/s13031-018-0166-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Background As performance-based financing (PBF) is increasingly implemented across sub-Saharan Africa, some authors have suggested that it could be a 'stepping stone' for health-system strengthening and broad health-financing reforms. However, so far, few studies have looked at whether and how PBF is aligned to and integrated with national health-financing strategies, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Objective This study attempts to address the existing research gap by exploring the role of PBF with reference to: (1) user fees/exemption policies and (2) basic packages of health services and benefit packages in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria. Methods The comparative case study is based on document review, key informant interviews and focus-group discussions with stakeholders at national and subnational levels. Results The findings highlight different experiences in terms of PBF's integration. Although (formal or informal) fee exemption or reduction practices exist in all settings, their implementation is not uniform and they are often introduced by external programmes, including PBF, in an uncoordinated and vertical fashion. Additionally, the degree to which PBF indicators lists are aligned to the national basic packages of health services varies across cases, and is influenced by factors such as funders' priorities and budgetary concerns. Conclusions Overall, we find that where national leadership is stronger, PBF is better integrated and more in line with the health-financing regulations and, during phases of acute crisis, can provide structure and organisation to the system. Where governmental stewardship is weaker, PBF may result in another parallel programme, potentially increasing fragmentation in health financing and inequalities between areas supported by different donors.