Shortly after the Arab Spring began in 2010, multiple scholars noted that the dominant discursive trend present within these protests was that of post-Islamism. Post-Islamism is broadly defined as an ideology seeking to establish a democratic state within a distinctly Islamic society. Despite the presence of post-Islamist opportunity structures, social movements embodying post-Islamist principles have had little success consolidating power. The theoretical argument presented here is that the failure of these movements is the result of inherent flaws within post-Islamist frames. Specifically, this study posits that unlike traditional Islamist frames (i.e., frames emphasizing the creation of a state governed by Shari'a) post-Islamist frames limit the ability of movements' to monopolize religion as a cultural asset. As such, when post-Islamist movements face political challenges during contentious periods they cannot rely on nontemporal legitimacy to retain power. Additionally, the challenging task of integrating Islamic and democratic frames in contentious moments renders post-Islamist movements susceptible to counterframing. The preceding claims will be tested through a comparative analysis of the Iranian Hierocracy (1977)(1978)(1979), and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (2011)(2012)(2013)(2014). Comparing the experiences of a post-Islamist movement (Brotherhood) with that of an Islamist movement (Hierocracy) will explicate the flaws within post-Islamist frames.The major question which will guide this study is if the opportunity structure present at the outset of the 2010 Arab Uprisings was indeed post-Islamist, why did post-Islamist social movements struggle to consolidate power? Using a comparative case study design focusing on the Iranian Hierocracy (1977-1979) and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (2011, my study explicates the reasons why, despite decided advantages in terms of mobilization structures and state capacity (more on this latter), the Brotherhood were unable to replicate the Hierocracy's successful consolidation of power. It is my contention that comparing the experiences of a post-Islamist movement (Brotherhood) with that of an Islamist movement (Hierocracy) is the most effective method for explicating the problems within post-Islamist frames. While this study acknowledges that all Islamists did not share the success of the Hierocracy, their challenges have been documented elsewhere (Bayat, 2007(Bayat, , 2011. As such, the explanation for why of some Islamist movements have succeeded and others have not is beyond the scope of this study.The theoretical argument presented here is that as opportunity structures in Muslim-majority societies become more post-Islamist in character, Islamist framing strategies will resonate with few segments of civil society. The dilemma which then arises is that if groups use Islamist framing techniques (i.e., strategies of the Hierocracy), they risk alienating large portions of the population who value democracy. However, by adopting post-Islamist techniques movements...

No abstract

No abstract