Public administration scholars are beginning to pay more attention to the problem of common source bias, but little is known about the approaches that applied researchers are adopting as they attempt to confront the issue in their own research. In this essay, we consider the various responses taken by the authors of six articles in this journal. We draw attention to important nuances of the common measurement issue that have previously received little attention and run a set of empirical analyses in order to test the effectiveness of several proposed solutions to the common-source-bias problem. Our results indicate that none of the statistical remedies being used by public administration scholars appear to be reliable methods of countering the problem. Currently, it appears as though the only reliable solution is to find independent sources of data when perceptual survey measures are employed.

This article presents a conceptual perspective on the distinctive characteristics of public organizations and their personnel. This perspective leads to hypotheses that public organizations deliver distinctive goods and services that influence the motives and rewards for their employees. These hypotheses are tested with evidence from the International Social Survey Programme in order to compare public and private employees in 30 nations. Public employees in 28 of the 30 nations expressed higher levels of public‐service‐oriented motives. In all of the countries, public employees were more likely to say they receive rewards in the form of perceived social impact. In most of the countries, public employees placed less importance on high income as a reward and expressed higher levels of organizational commitment. The findings presented here add to previous evidence that public employees seek and attain more altruistic and public‐service‐oriented rewards than private sector employees. In particular, we add evidence that these differences hold in many different nations and cultural contexts. Compensation and incentive system reforms in many governments have often concentrated on financial incentives and streamlining procedures for discipline and removal. Such matters are important but should not drive out concerns with showing public employees the impact of their work on the well‐being of others and on the community and society. Leaders and managers should invest in incentive systems that emphasize such motives and rewards. Leaders and managers should invest in the use of altruistic and socially beneficial motives and rewards in recruiting systems.

This essay highlights the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in governance and society and explores the relationship between AI, discretion, and bureaucracy. AI is an advanced information communication technology tool (ICT) that changes both the nature of human discretion within a bureaucracy and the structure of bureaucracies. To better understand this relationship, AI, discretion, and bureaucracy are explored in some detail. It is argued that discretion and decision-making are strongly influenced by intelligence, and that improvements in intelligence, such as those that can be found within the field of AI, can help improve the overall quality of administration. Furthermore, the characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses of both human discretion and AI are explored. Once these characteristics are laid out, a further exploration of the role AI may play in bureaucracies and bureaucratic structure is presented, followed by a specific focus on systems-level bureaucracies. In addition, it is argued that task distribution and task characteristics play a large role, along with the organizational and legal context, in whether a task favors human discretion or the use of AI. Complexity and uncertainty are presented as the major defining characteristics for categorizing tasks. Finally, a discussion is provided about the important cautions and concerns of utilizing AI in governance, in particular, with respect to existential risk and administrative evil.