Objective: I test for racial and gender bias in the enforcement of "stand your ground" (SYG) laws, controlling for potential confounders often invoked to reject claims of racism and sexism. Method: Regressions, simulations, and genetic matching are conducted using case-level data from 237 incidents in the US state of Florida between 2005 and 2013. Results: Controlling for potential confounders, the probability of conviction for a white defendant against a white victim is an estimated 90% with much error; for a black defendant it is nearly 100% with little error. For a male defendant in a domestic case, the probability is 40% whereas for a female defendant it is 80%. Conclusions: Enforcement of SYG laws appears biased against people of color in general and women specifically in the home. Policy implications are especially stark because these findings contradict recent research conducted for the US Senate.

Scholars debate whether the arrival of artificial superintelligence-a form of intelligence that significantly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in most domainswould bring positive or negative consequences. I argue that a third possibility is plausible yet generally overlooked: for several different reasons, an artificial superintelligence might "choose" to exert no appreciable effect on the status quo ante (the already existing collective superintelligence of commercial cyberspace). Building on scattered insights from web science, philosophy, and cognitive psychology, I elaborate and defend this argument in the context of current debates about the future of artificial intelligence.There are multiple ways in which an artificial superintelligence might effectively do nothing-other than what is already happening. The first is related to what, in computability theory, is called the "halting problem." As we will see, whether an artificial superintelligence would ever display itself as such is formally incomputable. We are mathematically incapable of excluding the possibility that a superintelligent computer program, for instance, is already operating somewhere, intelligent enough to fully camouflage its existence from the inferior intelligence of human observation. Moreover, it is plausible that at least one of the many subroutines of such an artificial superintelligence might never complete. Second, while theorists such as Nick Bostrom [3] andStephen Omohundro [11] give reasons to believe that, for any final goal, any sufficiently

Objective. Research on the Tea Party finds that both libertarian and authoritarian attitudes drive support for this movement, but political scientists lack a satisfactory explanation of this contradiction. Methods. Factor analysis of nine attitudes from the 2012 American National Election Study is used to explore whether statism and moral traditionalism are intercorrelated on a dimension distinct from attitudes toward government; regression analysis is used to test if these distinct dimensions help to explain support for the Tea Party. Results. Controlling for several competing explanations, the multiplicative interaction of anti-government and morally statist ideological factors is shown to be a predictor of Tea Party support, especially among conservatives. (Courser, 2012;Disch, 2011;Maxwell and Parent, 2012;Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin, 2011), how it combines elements of elite and grassroots political mobilization in new and innovative ways (Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel, 2012;Karpowitz et al., 2011), how it is a racialized response to the election of the first African-American president (Abramowitz, 2012;Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel, 2012;Disch, 2011;Lowndes, 2012;Skocpol and Williamson, 2012), and how it might connect with more militarized elements of the American far right (Parker and Barreto, 2013;Skocpol and Williamson, 2012). Less attention has been paid to the question of whether a specific ideology might be driving support for the Tea Party. When ideology is explicitly addressed, authors tend to note a peculiar contradiction in core beliefs of Tea Party supporters: the Tea Party seems to embody an odd fusion of libertarianism and social conservatism (Arceneaux and Nicholson, 2012;Berlet, 2012;Montgomery, 2012;Parker and Barreto, 2013; Williamson, Skocpol, and * Direct correspondence to Justin Murphy, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Southampton, University Road, Building 58, Office 3083, Southampton SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom j.murphy@soton.ac.uk . We would like to thank Kevin Arceneaux, Philip Chen, Monica Schneider, Bill Gorton, Tracy Strong, David Owen, John Boswell, Keith Gaddie, and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments on previous versions of this article. A replication archive with all of the data and computer code required to reproduce this article can be found at http://bit.ly/misarchism-supplement .This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.

Some scholars have argued that lower levels of media attention given to female candidates, relative to male candidates, may contribute to the under-representation of women in politics. Yet, other research suggests female candidates may receive more coverage than male candidates. To advance our understanding of this issue, we introduce and analyse a novel dataset measuring the weekly quantity of newspaper coverage given to 72 different candidates across 34 of the most marginal constituencies in the 2015 UK General Election. The data span 31 local and 6 national newspapers. Statistical analyses and two pairs of quantitatively matched, qualitative comparisons suggest that female candidates received more newspaper coverage than male candidates, even after controlling for several alternative predictors of media attention including party, incumbency, and time until election. Our findings have important implications for debates about gender equality in British politics.

Much is known about the domestic politics of globalization but political scientists have largely ignored one critical link between the international economy and many individuals around the world: mass media. Considering the likely effects of mass media on public perceptions of responsibility, this article develops an argument about the effects of mass media on individuals' blame attributions for the adjustment costs of economic globalization. The theory is tested on survey data from France in 1992-1993. The evidence suggests that mass media may shift the public's blame attributions away from the government and toward external, international forces.