Recent acceleration of Chinese engagement in African hydropower is attracting increasing attention and concern. Yet there is scant research and little reliable data on this engagement. This article analyses Chinese hydropower engagement based on a new, verified dataset. We examined over 100 projects reported by the media and lists compiled by other organizations, amassing case studies for each project using desk research, interviews and field visits. We demonstrate that Chinese engagement in African hydropower is often overestimated in both numbers and value. Further, misunderstanding and myths abound regarding Chinese financing and construction practices. This evidence‐based understanding provides a firmer foundation for advocacy, research and efforts by other companies and funding agencies to co‐operate with Chinese actors in this controversial sector.

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

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Hydropower projects are one of the leading energy sectors being developed in Africa. In the past two decades, this demand has been increasingly met by Chinese financing and Chinese contractors, creating an impression that host countries have no choice but to accept Chinese advances against their preferences. This essay demonstrates through the case study of the Mount Coffee hydropower project in Liberia that host countries strategically allocate financing from different sources to different projects, based on domestic development needs, administrative capacity, flexibility of financiers, and institutional memory between the host and the financiers. This essay also shows that concerns over Chinese contractors' environmental- and social-impact records reflect a combination of host enforcement, financier self-sorting, and Chinese contractors' own perceptions of their comparative advantage. More broadly, this case study provides empirical observations of host countries' agency and strategic calculus in the financier-host relation, as well as the limits of China's role in Africa's hydropower sector.

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