This article traces out the causes for why Nepal’s search for prosperity through transit diplomacy appears to be an un accomplished venture. Identifying different indicators of Nepal’s transit diplomacy, it specifies to what extent Nepal can execute its transit diplomacy and to what extent it cannot. This article also argues that Nepal’s proposal of trilateral ism to its immediate neighbours, India to the South and China to the North, itself, so far has not been institutionalized through any means of trilateral dialogues or ministerial-level meetings. It has only been reduced to the status of a metaphor merely inferring Nepal’s possibilities to bridge two emerging economies in the neighbourhood, which are, however, deemed as the prime actors of Easternization process itself. Hypothesizing that the venture of transit diplomacy has not gained sufficient momentum, this article does not only assess the reluctance of India in providing momentum to trilaterialism, but underlines Nepal’s lack of preparation and assertiveness which have actually sidelined her plausible role to make it happen at Nepal’s larger interest. The idea of trilateralism should, therefore, bear an institutional reality. Without such an institutionalization, Nepal’s quest for prosperity through transit diplomacy might not yield expected results, and shall always dwell on the status of an un accomplished venture.

Journal of Political Science Vol.7(1) 2004 p.15-19

In 21st century, the discourse of diplomacy has taken a new turn which has led to an emergence of advanced practices of Diplomacy. This alteration has influenced Nepal’s diplomatic practices wherein the practice of diplomacy transformed immensely. With this note, this paper primarily focuses on the diplomatic practices of Nepal post 1990. It reflects on the relationship between the regime and the diplomatic practices in reference to the systemic and the state level of analysis. It further emphasizes on the Public Diplomacy as a significant aspect while conducting diplomacy in the 21st century. Additionally, the analysis comprehends public diplomacy in relation with the democratic political structure. Next, Total Diplomacy is taken under scrutiny. The significance of Total Diplomacy in case of Nepal is discussed and the challenges of adapting Total diplomacy with the changing political structure are emphasized upon.

Although the Chinese government has a strong preference for bilateral diplomatic negotiations to resolve disputes, its status as a party to UNCLOS and its continuing failure to reach a settlement with the Philippines has exposed it to the risk of litigation. Additionally, if the arbitration goes forward, China may be at a disadvantage because several Chinese assertions about their South China Sea rights are not well supported in international law. China’s leaders may also have concerns about avoid nationalists who are sensitive to any perception that the government lost control of a high profile issue to a small Southeast Asian state and a Japanese judge. Nonetheless, now that the Chinese have rejected the process, the panel will proceed without them, providing a small “victory” for Manila and potentially swinging international public opinion toward the Philippines. China being an established regional power and aspiring global power would better show her generosity to take the countries in neighborhood in confidence. For this, resolving South China Sea issue by win-win strategy will be of great benefit for regional stability and security in South East Asian region.

Among the small group of American scholars specializing in modern Japan, Kenneth Wallace Colegrove (1887-1975) is a recognized name among the academic community, but Colegrove probably became fascinated by the democratization of Japan (Taisho