In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the cold chain transportation of medicines is becoming more and more critical to the quality and safety of drugs. In order to better motivate the logistics service providers to adopt the cold chain transportation strategy, this paper constructs a multiparty evolutionary game model composed of the government, logistics service providers, and medical institutions, and models behavioral strategies. The interaction is simulated and analyzed. Focusing on the contradictions between cost and service level in cold chain transportation, the revenue-sharing coefficient between medical institutions and logistics service providers and the government's reward and punishment mechanism are introduced. The results show the following: (1) a reasonable revenue sharing contract between the medical institution and logistics service provider will prompt the logistics service provider to use cold chain transportation. (2) With the government's penalties and rewards being further increased, the logistics service provider will tend to use noncold chain transportation. Therefore, the government must set a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism to ensure drug safety. (3) With the increasing revenue of the medical institution, the probability of the logistics service provider using noncold chain transportation decreases. In order to avoid medical malpractice related to noncold chain transportation, the government should appropriately adjust drug price restrictions to increase drug sales revenue. (4) With the rate of medical malpractice being increased, the evolution of each stakeholder to the equilibrium point of the game is accelerated.

The climate crisis and the increasing temperature of the earth have highlighted the need to reduce carbon emissions in supply chains, which has gradually become a global consensus. The focus has often been on traditional carbon emission industries, such as energy and transportation, while the pharmaceutical industry has received little attention. This paper, therefore, aims to fill that research gap by exploring the carbon emission reduction mechanisms of the pharmaceutical supply chain, specifically the role of public participation. We constructed a quadrilateral evolutionary game model, based on evolutionary game theory, consisting of local government, pharmaceutical manufacturers, wastewater treatment plants, and the public. By finding the equilibrium point of the system of replicator dynamics, evolutionary stable strategies are obtained. Our numerical simulation shows the impacts of the principal strategy change and the key variables. This paper also identifies some management implications: 1) When local governments implement a combination policy (carbon subsidies and carbon tax policy), the key is to formulate a subsidy level satisfactory to the four parties. If the subsidy level is in the middle level, the four parties are at their most willing to participate in carbon emission reduction. 2) When local governments implement a single policy (carbon tax policy), the carbon tax rate becomes the key variable. A high level of carbon tax accelerates carbon emission reduction in the pharmaceutical supply chain. 3) No matter what policies local governments implement, the free-rider effect between pharmaceutical manufacturers and wastewater treatment plants always hinders their low-carbon decisions. 4) Public reporting is an effective measure for promoting carbon emission reduction in the pharmaceutical supply chain. When local governments implement a combination policy, it can reduce the cost of reporting and improve the willingness of the public to report. Finally, we put forward suggestions for rationalizing carbon emission reduction.

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