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We test for the presence of low-dimensional chaotic structure in crude oil, heating oil, and unleaded gasoline futures prices from the early 1980s. Evidence on chaos will have important implications for regulators and short-term trading strategies. While we find strong evidence of non-linear dependencies, the evidence is not consistent with chaos. Our test results indicate that ARCH-type processes, with controls for seasonal variation in prices, generally explain the non-linearities in the data. We also demonstrate that employing seasonally adjusted price series contributes to obtaining robust results via the existing tests for chaotic structure. Maximum likelihood methodologies, that are robust to the non-linear dynamics, lend support for Samuelson's hypothesis on contract-maturity effects in futures price-changes. However, the tests for chaos are not found to be sensitive to the maturity effects in the futures contracts. The results are robust to controls for the oil shocks of 1986 and 1991.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System and University of Wisconsin Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Land Economics.ABSTRACT. The behavior of privately and publicly owned water utilities is examined by estimating a generalized variable cost function containing the regular characteristics of the neoclassical cost function without requiring that cost minimization subject to market prices be imposed as a maintained hypothesis. Assuming that unobserved shadow prices reflect the regulatory environment of the water industry, tests for cost minimization are obtained by deriving shadow prices as functions of market prices. The empirical results provide evidence that public water utilities are more efficient than private utilities on average, but are more widely dispersed between best and worst practice. (JEL L33)

This paper examines the problem of simultaneous‐equations bias in estimation of the water demand function under an increasing block rate structure. The Hausman specification test is used to detect the presence of simultaneous‐equations bias arising from correlation of the price measures with the regression error term in the results of a previously published study of water demand in Tucson, Arizona. An alternative simultaneous equation model is proposed for estimating the elasticity of demand in the presence of block rate pricing structures and availability of service charges. This model is used to reestimate the price and rate premium elasticities of demand in Tucson, Arizona for both the usual long‐run static model and for a simple short‐run demand model. The results from these simultaneous equation models are consistent with a priori expectations and are unbiased.

The relative efficiency of service provision by publicly versus privately owned enterprises has been the subject of considerable theoretical debate and empirical investigation for at least the last hundred years. This research investigates the relative efficiencies of publicly versus privately owned water utilities. The publicly owned enterprises are found to be more efficient overall, as well as in the technical efficiency associated with the employment of labor, capital, energy, and material inputs. No significant differences are found in scale efficiencies between the two classes of enterprise. The greatest level of inefficiency results from the overuse of capital relative to the most efficient firms in the sample, while discrepancies in labor use was the least among the four inputs considered.