No abstract

No abstract

The Brazilian and Turkish public administrations display a mixture of patrimonial, traditional bureaucratic and managerial characteristics. This patchwork is a result of more than a century of disjointed reform attempts to address chronic institutional problems such as government inefficiency, political patronage and corruption. Based on a comparative study of the two cases using official data, reports and a review of the public administration literature, this paper analyses the historical evolution and present structures of the civil service in Brazil and Turkey. Both public administrations continue to face diverse sets of challenges today, albeit in different forms and degrees: government inefficiency comes across as a major problem in Brazil, while the deterioration of the merit principle is particularly disconcerting in Turkey. Public sector employees enjoy more limited rights and benefits in Turkey compared to Brazil, where the civil service is faced with the opposite charge of undue privilege in a highly unequal society. Finally, while corruption and political patronage remain problematic in both cases, their causes appear to be different.

This is the version of the chapter accepted for publication in Başer, Bahar and Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi, (eds.

Between 2016 and 2020, a group of activist generals successfully plotted the Brazilian military's gradual return to the political center stage with powers unseen since the dictatorship. They achieved this without formally breaking the law, suspending the democratic process or overthrowing the government. We call this a “stealth intervention,” an incremental yet systematic attempt to redesign politics without causing a rupture, that fits neither in the existing typology of coups nor in the literature on democratic backsliding. We argue that Brazil’ stealth intervention, built upon the military’s existing tutelary prerogatives and driven by an unreformed praetorian worldview that resurfaced amidst a sustained crisis of democracy, challenges the prevalent view of the armed forces as a reactive force that intervenes in civilian politics only when its institutional interests are threatened. Finally, we show that democratic backsliding in Brazil started under Bolsonaro’s predecessor, Michel Temer, and point to the generals’ understudied role in this process.