Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of January sentiment on investors’ asset allocation decisions in the US corporate bond market during the rest of the year. Specifically, the study evaluates if the shift in January sentiment is a predictor of corporate bond spreads from February to December. Design/methodology/approach Using corporate bond trades reported in TRACE between 2005 and 2014, the authors examine the ability of the Index of Consumer Sentiment and the Index of Investor Sentiment to predict bond spreads over the 11 months following January. The study evaluates both the sign of the change in sentiment and the magnitude of the change in sentiment using two generalized linear models, controlling for industry, bond and firm fixed effects. Portfolios are analyzed based on yield, firm size and firm leverage. Additional analysis is performed to ensure results are robust to the impacts of the subprime financial crisis. Findings This paper finds that the changes in the sentiment measures in January predict bond spreads associated with bond trades in the subsequent 11 months, and this phenomenon, which the authors label as the “January sentiment effect,” has opposing impacts on risky and less risky bond portfolios. Originality/value This paper adds to the literature on the relationship between sentiment and investor’s allocation decisions. The evidence documented in this study is the first known to find that investors’ allocation decisions in a year are driven by their sentiment in January.

No abstract

Using International Monetary Fund lending data from 2005 through 2015, we find evidence that the IMF General Resources Account credit creates moral hazard that is concentrated in European and EU-member countries. Our results hold for the periods of time just prior to and after the financial crisis. In contrast, we find moral hazard associated with the IMF Poverty Reduction Growth Trust creates moral hazard only prior to the financial crisis and we attribute this change to the 2010 modifications to the trust.

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the political cost hypothesis and the effects of political sensitivity-induced governance in the US bond market by using yield spreads from bonds issued by a diverse sample of US government contractors. Design/methodology/approach Fixed effects regression analysis is used to test the relation between the political sensitivity of government contractor firms and their cost of debt. Findings Results illustrated that government contractors with greater political sensitivity are associated with larger yield spreads, indicating that bondholders require a premium when firms endure the costs of increased political oversight and the threat of outside intervention, reducing the certainty of future income. However, despite the overall positive impact of political sensitivity on bond yield spreads on average, the authors found that the additional government oversight is associated with lower spreads when the firm is facing greater repayment risk. Practical implications Despite the benefits of winning a government contract, this paper identifies a direct financial cost of increased political sensitivity because of additional firm oversight and potential intervention. Importantly, it also finds that this governance is valued by bondholders when faced with increased risk. Firms must balance their desire for government receipts with the costs and benefits of dependence on those expenditures. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature in its exploration of political sensitivity as an important determinant of the cost of debt for corporate government contractors. Specifically, the authors document a significant risk premium in bond pricing because of the joint effects of the visibility and importance of government contracts to the firm.

No abstract