The United Kingdom (UK) Financial Reporting Council (FRC) introduced expanded audit reports to improve audit report disclosures and render audits more transparent to financial statement users. This study examines audit materiality threshold disclosures, providing descriptive evidence of how auditors disclose materiality information in UK audit reports. This research uses manual content analysis (i) to assess auditors' benchmarks and the percentages auditors apply to those benchmarks. The analysis examines (ii) auditors' use of non-GAAP benchmarks, including non-recurring and recurring item exclusions and (iii) auditors' rationales for their benchmark choices. The research finds that auditors choose a wide variety of benchmarks and apply a wide range of percentages to the chosen benchmarks. Non-GAAP adjustments are pervasive. Auditors' rationales for benchmark choices include that the benchmark is a financial statement performance measure, and the benchmark eliminates volatility. The authors question whether the FRC's expanded disclosures have met its transparency objectives and concludes that 'more (disclosure) is less'.

The Financial Reporting Council is the first auditing standard-setting body to require audit materiality threshold disclosure. Audit materiality thresholds are a function of auditor benchmark choices and percentage rates chosen for the benchmarks. This study investigates the association between audit effort and audit materiality thresholds, auditor benchmark choices and auditors’ use of benchmarks computed based on non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (non-GAAP) measures. The study uses expanded audit reports of 328 FTSE-350 companies with 2015 year-ends. The research finds a negative association between audit effort (proxied by audit fees) and audit materiality thresholds. The analysis provides new evidence on the association between audit effort and auditor benchmark choices. First, it reveals that audit effort is negatively associated with asset rather than other (profit/adjusted profit/revenue) benchmark choices. Second, it finds that audit effort is positively associated with non-GAAP benchmarks, indicating that auditors spend more time on their audits when there are unusual events.

PurposeThis rich descriptive study examines auditors' client risk assessment (i.e. “key audit matters”/critical audit matters) disclosures in expanded audit reports of 328 Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 companies. The study compares auditor-identified client risks with corporate risk disclosures identified in audit committee reports, in terms of number and type of risks. The research also compares variation in auditor-identified client risks between individual Big 4 audit firms. In addition, the study examines auditor ranking of their client risks disclosed.Design/methodology/approachThe study manually content analyses disclosures in audit reports and audit committee reports of a sample of 328 FTSE-350 companies with 2015 year-ends.FindingsAudit committees identify more risks than auditors (23% more risks). However, auditor-identified client risks and audit-committee-identified risks are similar (80% similar), as are auditor-identified client risks between the individual Big 4 audit firms. Only ten (3%) audit reports rank the importance of auditor-identified client risks.Research limitations/implicationsSample is restricted to one year, one jurisdiction, large-listed companies and companies audited by Big 4 auditors.Practical implicationsThe study provides important insights for regulators, auditors and users of financial statements by identifying influences on disclosure of auditor-identified client risks.Originality/valueThe paper mobilises institutional theory to interpret the findings. The findings suggest that auditor-identified client risks in expanded audit reports may demonstrate mimetic behaviour in terms of similarity with audit-committee-identified risks and similarity between individual Big 4 audit firms. The study provides important insights for regulators, auditors and users of financial statements by identifying influences on disclosure of auditor-identified client risks.