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In this study, the interaction between the competition-cooperation nexus and regulation in retail payment systems is analysed by applying the main lessons from the theory of network industries. This is justifiable on the grounds that the payment systems industry inherently has many characteristics in common with network industries. On the other hand, since the provision of payment services also has many special characteristics, the regulatory tools commonly used in many other network industries cannot be applied directly. In general, the main role of payment system regulators is to provide a level playing field for different service providers. To secure dynamic efficiency, the regulators also need to ensure adequate incentives for innovation and investment. In this respect, it is important that they do not take too restrictive an attitude towards cooperation among payment service providers. In addition to general policy analysis, the study also analyses developments in the European retail payment system field and the roles and aims of market participants.

The sonographers had good correlations with the number of erosions and they were successful in separating healthy bones from bones with erosions. It seems that neither depth nor width is crucial but that in experimental conditions a 1.5 mm erosion width was the limit for the resolution with current ultrasound equipment. Ultrasound is a valid and reliable method of detecting cortical bone erosions in vitro, when the round erosion is at least 1 mm deep and 1.5 mm wide.

Using a spatial competition model of retail payment networks, this paper discusses the likely economic consequences associated with the formation of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). The model considers an expansion of positive network externalities on the demand side and adjustment cost on the supply side and reveals that the introduction of SEPA may not lead to a fully competitive and integrated retail payment markets. This is especially the case when the markets are segments before the introduction of SEPA. In such a scenario, the post-integrated markets are likely to remain segmented or will be characterised by a kinked equilibrium where no significant price competition takes place. In both outcomes, SEPA leads to increased prices, larger network sizes (ie increased number of customers) and a higher consumer surplus. Additionally, if the SEPA-induced adjustment costs for payment networks are not prohibitively high, SEPA may also lead to an increase in both profits and social welfare.

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