We propose two models to explain why individuals participate in collective political action—a personal influence model and a collective rationality model. Each model overcomes the free-rider problem posed by conventional rational choice theory and left unresolved in previous research. The models are tested for legal and illegal protest behaviors, using data from a national sample and two samples of protest-prone communities in the Federal Republic of Germany. The personal influence model is supported for both forms of participation, while the collective rationality model is supported for legal protest. We discuss implications of the results for grievance and rational choice theories of collective political action.

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A basic problem for a rational choice theory of rebellious collective action is to explain why average citizens would participate in such behavior, since they have nothing to gain (they will receive benefits of successful rebellion, in terms of public goods, regardless of whether they take part or not), but much to lose (rebellious behavior may be quite costly). According to the conventional private interest or “by-product” theory, the incentive to participate must come from the expectation of receiving selective benefits; but since average citizens in a general case cannot expect substantial private material rewards, the relevant selective benefits must be psychological in nature. In contrast to the model of private interest theory, a public goods model is proposed, stipulating that the value of rebellion in terms of public goods can be a relevant incentive for participation. Using data from surveys conducted in New York City and Hamburg, West Germany, we investigate the relationship between participation in rebellious political behavior and measures of the incentives of public goods and private interest. The results do not support predictions of the private interest model in regard to nonmaterial selective incentives. Hypotheses of the public goods model are supported.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Oxford University Press and Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Forces. AbstractSeveral major theoriesdeprivation theory, resource mobilization theory, and the theory of collective actionmake different predictions about the effects of repression on political protest. The results of empirical research have been inconclusive as well: some studies have found that repression deters protest, whereas others have found a positive (radicalizing) effect of repression on protest. This article proposes a model that explains the different effects of repression, in conjunction with other incentives, on political protest. Wefirst hypothesize that repression has a direct negative (deterring) effect on protest because repression is a cost. This direct effect may be endorsed under some conditions, or it may be neutralized, or even reversed if repression leads to micromobilization processes that raise incentives for protest. 77Tese processes are set in motion if persons are exposed to repression, if repression is considered illegitimate by these persons and their social environment (whzich holds in case of legal protest), and if these persons are members of groups that support protest. Under such conditions repression indirectly increases protest by launching micromnobilization processes. These processes and their effects are specified in a model which is tested and confinned by a panel study of opponents of nuclear power in West Germany.

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