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Regulators now require auditors to provide information about how they evaluate complex estimates. Because users encounter this auditor-provided information alongside management-provided information, we jointly examine the value relevance of these disclosures. We also examine whether visual cues in audit reports influence how nonprofessional investors use these disclosures. We find that disclosures from managers and auditors provide different value-relevant information about the same underlying issue. While users struggle to weight fully narrative auditor disclosures in their valuation judgments without corresponding management disclosures, visual cues facilitate their weighting of information about the audit. Specifically, users take increased price protection when auditor disclosures also include visual cues. However, consistent with market signaling theory, corresponding voluntary disclosures from management attenuate this price protection. This suggests management can mitigate negative valuation effects that may arise from auditor disclosures, and implies that visual cues in audit reports can prompt managers to increase disclosure transparency. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

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SUMMARY We develop and test a model that anticipates detrimental performance effects in within-office distributed teams (i.e., teams based out of the same office that conduct work at different geographic locations). This setting offers a clean test of theory around distributed work because it eliminates confounding factors such as differences in culture and language. Using an experiential questionnaire we find that greater distribution is negatively associated with team communication (quality, ease, and spontaneity) and auditors' sense of shared context (access to the same information, mutual understanding, and common norms), which are in turn negatively associated with engagement performance (efficiency, commitment to excellence, overall work quality, adhering to the budget, and the team's innovative approach). Further, we find an indirect effect between distribution and performance through communication and shared context when accountability is lower, but not higher, implying that accountability interventions have the potential to aid performance quality in distributed teams. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

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