In connection with the entry into force of the Anti-terrorism Act, administrators of many production facilities are required to prepare a number of anti-terrorism procedures called anti-terrorist/AT attachment (Security plan related to facilities and equipment subject to mandatory protection in respect of terrorist threats). The article is a case study of the AT attachment implementation in several production plants belonging to one enterprise. It characterizes the strategy adopted in this company and the solutions developed in 2017-2019 in several production plants. The purpose of the article is to show why the implementation of this procedure is a challenge for the company.

The critical infrastructure (CI) has an important place in Polish security system. The article discusses legal acts and characterises the notion of critical infrastructure as an element essential for the functioning of the society. As a result of the entry into force of the Anti-terrorism Act from 10 June 2016 (Journal of Laws [Dz.U.], item 904), the current procedure of security plan acceptance was extended to include participation of the Internal Security Agency through the requirement to submit a so-called anti-terrorist attachment. The article is an analysis of the constituent parts of the document and procedures it covers. Moreover, the authors present conclusions and recommendations resulting from the analysis of AT attachments of CI facilities and other facilities subject to mandatory protection. The empirical system of reference is based on facilities located in Silesia. The authors described their experiences related to the process of preparation and acceptance of AT attachments as well as conclusions based on employee trainings conducted in workplaces where antiterrorism procedures are in force.

The article deals with three terrorist attacks of right-wing extremists: in Norway (2011), New Zealand (2019) and Germany (2019). First, the modus operandi of perpetrators was shown and the course of each attack was analyzed. It was indicated what tactics the attackers used and why it was or was not effective. Secondly, the ideological background and motivations of the perpetrators were shown. It was possible to analyze the manifestos that the perpetrators left, and thus their way of thinking, their ideologies, and the purposes of organizing the attacks. Thirdly, issues related to the publicizing of the attacks by the perpetrators were shown. The goal of the article is to show that radical ideology of right-wing extremists (expressed in manifestos) leads to tragedies. In analyzed cases radical appointment of the perpetrators caused three deadly attacks. The article shows that the radical actions are preceded by radical speech, expressions, manifestos. The second goal is to pay attention to hate speech (also expressed in manifestos), which is just as dangerous as bullets or improvised explosive devices. The third goal is to show how the attackers used acts of terror to spread the ideologies to which they were devoted.

The goal of this paper is to analyse challenges related to protecting Polish critical infrastructure (CI) against air threats, such as UAVs, as a case study in a wider discussion on protection of critical infrastructure worldwide. The Polish legal definition of critical infrastructure and laws regarding the protection of such facilities are explained in the article in order to provide context. A review of scientific literature and open-source analysis of known air attacks on CI and the capabilities of air platforms are also included, with special attention being paid to unmanned systems. The threats themselves have been divided into two groups of scenarios: peacetime threats and crisis situations that have hybrid wartime scenarios. Depending on the scenario, the different capabilities of actors must be taken into account. Peacetime air threats include the use of commercially available drones. Those devices have limited capabilities, in terms of weaponisation, due to the limited weight of their cargo and the flight range. More advanced devices, including custom–built drones and military systems, can be supplied and used by state actors. Therefore, there are different requirements regarding protection systems. In peacetime, anti-drone systems are certainly recommended due to their capabilities and safety of use for bystanders. In more dangerous scenarios, typical military systems, including Very Short-Range Air Defence, Short-Range Air Defence and Medium Range Air Defence systems have to be employed or dedicated kinetic counter-drone systems deployed.

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