A comparison of support schemes for market-based deployment of renewable energy in the UK and Germany shows that the feed-in tariff reduces costs to consumers and results in larger deployment. A survey among project developers suggests two explanations: (1) Site selection presents the biggest obstacle under the feed-in tariff. Uncertain financing of other schemes reduces efforts at initial project stages and planning permits become a major obstacle. (2) Project developers do not compete in price but for good sites under the feed-in tariff. Most importantly, turbine producers and construction services contribute to most of the costs, and face at least equal levels of competition under the feed-in tariff. r

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The production of heavy industry commodities is responsible for 1/3 of annual global GHG emissions. The Paris Agreement goals of +1.5-2°C require global emissions reach net-zero and possibly negative somewhere between 2060 and 2080. Given the normal timetable for retirement or retrofit of industrial facilities (>=20 years) all new equipment must be net-zero or negative carbon by the early 2040s. In this article we demonstrate to policymakers and modellers that industrial decarbonization is technically possible and how it might be achieved. First, we synthesize sectoral lab-bench and near-commercial technology options for reducing emissions to net-zero within 1-2 investment cycles, pathways more or less appropriate given regional resources (i.e. access to biomass, renewable electricity, or geological storage of CO 2) and political circumstances. Second, we synthesize policy options, focussing on those that encourage a managed transition from today's industry to net-zero emissions with a minimum of stranded assets, unemployment and social trauma.

In order to cover their CO 2 emissions, power companies receive most of the required EU ETS allowances for free. In line with economic theory, these companies pass on the costs of these allowances in the price of electricity. This article analyses the implications of the EU ETS for the power sector, notably the impact of free allocation of CO 2 emission allowances on the price of electricity and the profitability of power generation. As well as some theoretical reflections, the article presents empirical and model estimates of CO 2 cost pass-through for Germany and The Netherlands, indicating that pass-through rates vary between 60 and 100% of CO 2 costs, depending on the carbon intensity of the marginal production unit and various other market-or technology-specific factors. As a result, power companies realize substantial windfall profits, as indicated by the empirical and model estimates presented in the article.

Border tax, Emission trading, WTO law, International trade, K32, K33, F18, H23,