Preporuka većine medicinskih stručnjaka je redovita preventivna zaštita od zaraznih bolesti, ponajprije putem cijepljenja. Ipak, kao i svaki drugi medicinski postupak i ovaj sa sobom nosi određene rizike, koji ponekad mogu biti i fatalni. U tom slučaju oštećeni pojedinac i/ili članovi njegove obitelji, pod određenim uvjetima, mogu imati pravo na naknadu štete. Međutim, kada do obeštećenja pokušaju doći sudskim putem, suočavaju se s dugotrajnim i skupim postupkom dokazivanja uzročne veze između štete u obliku bolesti ili smrti i primljenog cjepiva. Osim nepogodnosti za oštećenu stranu, ovi sudski postupci često imaju negativni publicitet i veliki financijski teret tuženoj strani zbog čega je dolazilo i do zastoja u opskrbi cjepivima. Zbog toga su u nizu država osmišljeni programi naknade štete za teške ozljede ili smrt zbog nuspojava cijepljenja. Cilj je istraživanja stoga analiza i preporuka programa naknade štete zbog nuspojava cijepljenja i u odnosu na često dugotrajnu i skupu građansku parnicu, alternativnog načina obeštećenja. Osim zbog racionalizacije troškova i smanjenja opterećenosti sudova, uvođenje programa naknade štete zbog nuspojava cijepljenja u Republici Hrvatskoj posebno je preporučljivo i jer je u njoj cijepljenje zakonski propisano kao obvezatno. Drugim riječima, iako pacijenti u Republici Hrvatskoj imaju opće pravo na informirani pristanak prije medicinskog zahvata, kada je u pitanju preventivni zahvat cijepljenja nemaju pravo izbora. Nadalje, pri oformljivanju tijela koje vodi program valja ostati oprezan te ga sastaviti od stručnjaka s različitih područja zanimanja, kako bi mogli objektivno sagledati štetni događaj iz svih perspektiva, a ne samo pogodujući jednoj strani.

In the European Union the liability of producers for harm caused by defective products manufactured or imported by them is regulated in Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the liability for defective products. The purpose of Directive is to lay down a system of producer liability for damage caused by a defect in its product. Crucial is that it sets out a system of strict liability, so that the injured person does not have to show evidence of fault on the part of the producer. The injured person will have to prove the defect, the damage and the causal link between these. However, when it comes to the damage caused by vaccines, in case law the causal link has often been almost impossible to prove because in the scientific literature there are a number of opposing views on the risk of vaccination. Nevertheless, to the facilitation of the victims burden of proof could contribute the judgement of the Court of the European Union according to which a national court may consider that vaccination has led to the disease or damage even when there is no proof based on medical research. But, if there are other serious, specific and consistent evidence, such as the temporal proximity between the vaccination and the occurrence of a disease, the lack of personal and familiar history of that disease, together with the existence of other reported cases of the disease that occurred after such vaccines being received. Still, the Court retains caution by opposing any presumptions and warns that such cases are extremely fact-specific and require careful case-by-case considerations. In this article the author discusses the aforementioned judgement about liability for vaccine injury and its implications in the European Union.

The democratic world has invested much effort to achieve the conditions for full freedom of expression of the media, but still with that freedom other human rights and freedoms must be respected. What if the publication of information that is incorrect has the potential to cause some sort of damage or harm to an individual or the public? The problem of misinformation then raises the issue of legal interference and regulation. The vast problem today is that any posting on social networks can be spread and be shared with high speed, and the mere fact that a court ordered the removal of an original defamatory statement will often have no positive effects for the injured party since the information has been and will continue to be shared on the profiles of other users. In its recent decision in Case C-18/18 Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited, the Court of the European Union sets out rules for imposing an obligation on an information society service provider, ie. a social network, to delete and /or block access to identical and equivalent posts and links previously declared to be illegal without breach of Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive. This is a significant judgment with global implications. Before this judgement, at the request of a national court, posted content in the requesting state has been removed, but after this judgement, the force of the law can compel the controversial content in question to be removed from all servers around the world. An analysis of the judgment leads to the conclusion that the confirmation that a national court is entitled to request the removal of posts on a worldwide basis points to the fact that the Court of the European Union understands the limitations and unfairness of solutions when social networks restrict access to offensive and defamatory content only for IP addresses from a specific country. This decision extends the reach of EU legislation concerning the internet outside its borders. However, a high level of caution should be maintained so that excessive scrutiny of published content does not violate the freedom of expression.

Tema rada je pravo na pristup sudu, kao aspekt prava na pravično suđenje, kojem Ustavni sud pruža zaštitu u ustavnosudskim postupcima pokrenutim ustavnim tužbama, kojima se osporavaju odluke sudova donesene u razno- vrsnim sudskim postupcima. U radu se naglašava temeljni značaj konvencijske zaštite, a to je stvaranje i primjenjivanje standarda zaštite ljudskih prava u okviru pravnog prostora Europe te se, kroz stajališta Europskog suda za ljudska prava, koja je Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske prihvatio i razradio kroz konkretne predmete. Ističe se značaj ustavnosudskog aktivizma za zaštitu ljudskih prava. te se nalašava stajalište da je svrha članka 29. Ustava odnosno članka 6. Konvnencije u osiguranju poštenog postupanja, a ne u provjeri ispravnosti ishoda postupka. Tu tezu autori dokazuju kroz ovaj rad. Temeljni interes ovog rada, pravo na pristup sudu, autori prepoznaju kao izuzetno važan aspekt ustavnog prava na pravično suđenje. U prvom dijelu rada pristupa se općenito pravu na pravično suđenje i njegovim aspektima, daje se pogled prakse Europskog suda za ljudska prava i njezin utjecaj na praksu Ustavnog suda u konkretnom aspektu te se navode stajališta drugih država. U nastavku rada detaljno se analiziraju stajališta Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske vezana uz pravo na pristup sudu i, posebno, tijek promjena stajališta u ovom području zaštite. Stajališta Ustavnog suda i traženje sadržaja prava na pristup sudu autori prikazuju i kroz apstraktnu i konkretnu nadležnost Ustavnog suda. Tumačenje sadržaja ustavnih prava, koje Ustavni sud daje kroz svoje odluke i rješenja, autori smatraju najznačajnijim doprinosom razvoju ustavnog sudovanja u Republici Hrvatskoj.

In Avotiņš v. Latvia, the European Court of Human Rights (from now on: ECHR; Court) was questioning whether the Conventional right to a fair trial applies in cases of mutual recognition of judicial decisions on EU level. Without dealing with errors of fact or law allegedly made by a national court, the Court found it necessary to determine whether the national court has infringed the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Although the applicant claimed that the national court breached the Brussels I Regulation and thus violated the right to a fair trial, the ECHR concluded that it is not up to the Court to decide on the compliance of national law with international treaties and EU law. As it can be understood from the judgment, the ECHR holds that interpretation and application of the provisions of the EU regulations fall under the jurisdiction of the national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (from now on: the CJEU). However, the ECHR reaches a conclusion that the Contracting States are obliged to take care of the parties' procedural rights when applying the EU law for the reason that provisions of the EU law must not be applied mechanically, without bearing in mind the duty of taking into account the rights protected by the Convention. In this paper, the authors shall analyze the relationship between the ECHR and the CJEU taking into account and resorting to the ECtHR's findings in the case of Avotiņš v. Latvia.