The study of soft power in international relations suffers from a liberal democratic bias. Throughout the literature, liberal concepts and values are assumed to be universal in their appeal. This bias has led scholars to underestimate Russian soft power by instrumentalizing it, that is, to see it purely as the effect of governmentsponsored programs, and to focus solely on the cultural pillar of soft power. This paper argues, alternatively, that Russia's conservative values and illiberal governance models generate admiration and followership, even outside of what Russia claims to be its post-Soviet sphere of influence. Crucially, this admiration and followership perform the traditional function of soft power: generating support for controversial Russian foreign policy decisions. Admitting that soft power can be based on conservative values is necessary not only to understand Russia's foreign policy potential, but also the ability of non-Western states to successfully challenge the Western liberal order.

The essay discusses the origins and development of the idea of international society in the discipline of International Relations (IR). It locates the concept in the English School tradition, providing a summary of the classic statements as found in the writings of Wight, Bull and Manning. It engages with more recent writing, including Buzan’s reconceptualization of international society and explaining the pluralist-solidarist distinction. The essay traces key debates surrounding the concept, such as the expansion of international society, humanitarian intervention and the standard of civilisation. The final part presents the main criticisms of the concept and explores the ontological status of international society.

This article studies the contentious problem of reification in international relations (IR) on the example of the idea of international society. It shows how the idea became reified, that is, how the move was made from approaching international society as one of several competing frameworks for the study of international politics to considering it an objective fact, a self-evident reality of international politics, and an entity in the possession of agency. For this purpose, I trace key writings of the English school and survey their contribution to the idea’s development and gradual reification. I posit that reification has been the outcome of individual strategies and disciplinary practices pertaining to the knowledge production process, in particular the perceived need to establish and maintain a research program while continuing to provide viable explanations of world events. In discussing the consequences, I argue that reification adversely affects not only research outcomes but also the study process. A reified category, once it becomes a default language through which to think and talk about international politics, narrows down avenues for diverging interpretations of international politics. Furthermore, endowing international society with agency hides real agents behind specific actions in international politics.

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Following the end of the cold war and throughout the 1990s, Russia was described as the readily ‘joining’ international society. According to the English school perspective on IR, this meant that Russia was expected to adjust and accept the norms and rules established and propagated by mostly Western liberal states but hailed as common for the family of states. With Vladimir Putin's ascendance to power and Russia's economic recovery followed by Moscow's more assertive stance on global affairs, Russia was increasingly seen as the supporter of a pluralist vision of the international society, i.e. one characterized by limited cooperation, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention. These depictions ignored the fundamental differences in Russia's approach towards relations between states in the regional and global perspective. While on the global scale Russia cherishes norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, the regional realm has been subject to a variety of moves compromising the sovereignty of post-Soviet states. In the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia has been ready and willing to engage in undermining states’ sovereignty in a number of ways: attempting to establish a sphere of influence, directly intervening in a civil strives, policing borders, waging wars on ‘humanitarian’ grounds and stimulating separatisms, as well as undertaking less explicit interventionist activities of regional integration, security provision and development assistance. This article discusses these cases in order to make the point that Russia's approach to its most immediate neighbours cannot be subsumed under pluralist or solidarist vision of interstate relations. It highlights the difficulty to approach the Russian global-regional split using the conceptual apparatus of the English school and links it to a more perennial problem – that of the English school disregard for the specifics of post-colonial situations.