Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study if actively managed exchange-traded funds (AMETFs) and actively managed mutual funds (AMMFs) are complements or substitutes. It also tests if there are tax or liquidity clientele effects. Design/methodology/approach The study investigates the relation between individual AMMF flows and aggregate AMETF flows as well as individual AMETF flows and aggregate AMMF flows. A 2013 tax change is used to analyze if a tax clientele effect exists between the AMETF and AMMF markets. The authors use differences in investor groups for institutional vs retail fund share classes to test for liquidity clientele effects. Findings The authors find that equity and mixed AMETFs and AMMFs are substitutes, although not perfect substitutes. Taxation-related differences between the two products create a clientele effect for fixed income and mixed funds where tax-sensitive investors are more likely to substitute AMETFs for AMMFs surrounding tax increases. There is weak evidence that institutional investors may prefer AMETFs more than retail investors because of their enhanced liquidity. Originality/value This is the first study to investigate the flow relation between AMETFs and AMMFs. The fast-paced growth of the AMETF area coupled with the substitutability between the two products and tax advantages of AMETFs has the capability to gain significant market share from AMMFs in the future.

Managers are increasingly likely to use investor relations (IR) specialists to communicate to their investors during takeover contests. This paper is the first to study the use of external IR firms and their relation to merger and acquisition (M&A) deal characteristics. Targets that employ IR exhibit increased deal premiums, increases in the time to resolution, and a lower likelihood of deal completion, which may be associated with an IR firm’s media campaign and efforts to delay or prevent a deal. Bidders who utilize IR resources have deals that are more likely to be completed, which likely reflects their ability to educate investors.

We document the recent rise in the side-by-side (SBS) management of mutual funds and actively managed ETFs (AMETFs). Although these funds are run in a SBS manner, only 21% share an investment objective code. This relationship is started by families with more ETF experience and is not used to reward "star" managers. On average, mutual funds with SBS AMETFs perform similarly to comparable funds after SBS formation; however, their flows fall when pairs share the same investment objective. We find evidence of both a substitution effect and conflicts of interest between SBS funds, depending on the contracting and organizational structures.

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