The idea that our ongoing perceptions, cognitive processes and actions are influenced by prior events and experiences has recently received substantial support and attention from the proponents of the Predictive Processing (PP) and Active Inference framework (AIF) both in philosophy and computational neuroscience. In this view, the human brain actively 'predicts' or 'anticipates' what sensory input is coming next, on the basis of prior inputs. This is because humans are first and foremost biological organisms striving to reduce uncertainty and to survive within a highly volatile environment.In this paper we look at how perception, cognition and actions get off the ground from the outset, in utero.Indeed, one basic yet overlooked aspect of current PP and AIF approaches is that brains (and minds), and human bodies, first develop within another human body. Crucially, while not all humans will have the experience of being pregnant or carrying a baby, the experience of being carried and growing within another person's body is universal.Specifically, we define in utero development as a process co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, and highlight their close relationship under an active inference approach. Contrary to the common view of the foetus being passively 'contained' and solipsistically 'trapped' in the solitude of the womb, we will present evidence speaking in favour of an active, precarious and bidirectional co-regulation between the two living bodies, what we will call co-homeostasis. We build upon previous work looking at homeostatic and allostatic bodily mechanisms operating already in early stages of development. The co-embodiment and co-homeostasis theses will lay the preliminary ground for introducing an active inference reading of in utero development of perceptual experiences.We conclude that the co-embodiment and co-homeostasis theses may have important implications on several critical questions fuelling current debates on the nature of conscious experiences, minimal self-awareness and social cognition. Our paper lays the theoretical basis for understanding and addressing in future work the fundamental question: how humans self-regulate their homeostatic bodily states and build their most basic selfand world-models literally within and through others' bodies, in utero and beyond.

Recently, a monothematic delusion of body ownership due to brain damage (i.e., the embodiment of someone else's body part within the patient's sensorimotor system) has been extensively investigated. Here we aimed at defining in-depth the clinical features and the neural correlates of the delusion. Ninety-six stroke patients in a sub-acute or chronic phase of the illness were assessed with a full ad-hoc protocol to evaluate the embodiment of an alien arm under different conditions. A sub-group of seventy-five hemiplegic patients was also evaluated for the embodiment of the movements of the alien arm. Fifty-five patients were studied to identify the neural bases of the delusion by means of voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping approach. Our results show that, in forty percent of the whole sample, simply viewing the alien arm triggered the delusion, but only if it was a real human arm and that was seen from a 1 stperson perspective in an anatomically-correct position. In the hemiplegic sub-group, the presence of the embodiment of the alien arm was always accompanied by the embodiment of its passive and active movements. Furthermore, the delusion was significantly associated to primary proprioceptive deficits and to damages of the corona radiata and the superior longitudinal fasciculus. To conclude, we show that the pathological embodiment of an alien arm is well-characterized by recurrent and specific features and might be explained as a disconnection deficit, mainly involving white matter tracts. The proposed exhaustive protocol can be successfully employed to assess stroke-induced disorders of body awareness, unveiling even their more undetectable or covert clinical forms. Key words: body ownership, bodily self, brain-damaged patients, delusional body ownership, sense of agency RUNNING TITLE: delusional body ownership Recently, the reverse of this classic somatoparaphrenic delusion, namely the belief that someone else's limb belongs to oneself has been extensively investigated (Berti,

Despite the importance of touch in human–human relations, research in affective tactile practices is in its infancy, lacking in-depth understanding needed to inform the design of remote digital touch communication. This article reports two qualitative studies that explore tactile affective communication in specific social contexts, and the bi-directional creation, sending and interpretation of digital touch messages using a purpose-built research tool, the Tactile Emoticon. The system comprises a pair of remotely connected mitts, which enable users in different locations to communicate through tactile messages, by orchestrating duration and level of three haptic sensations: vibration, pressure and temperature. Qualitative analysis shows the nuanced ways in which 68 participants configured these elements to make meaning from touch messages they sent and received. It points to the affect and emotion of touch, its sensoriality and ambiguity, the significance of context, social norms and expectations of touch participants. Findings suggest key design considerations for digital touch communication, where the emphasis shifts from generating ‘recognizable touches’ to tools that allow people to shape their touches and establish common understanding about their meaning.

Our data demonstrate that irradiation induces HER-2/neu gene amplification and CEP17 polysomy thereby enhancing expression of this protein in breast cancer cell lines rendering them susceptible to treatment with trastuzumab. They also suggest that patients with HER-2/neu negative inoperable tumors undergoing local radiation therapy may benefit from treatment with trastuzumab.

Affective touch is important for maintaining emotional bonds and providing comfort. In this pilot study, we developed a silicone pneumatic soft robotic haptic device (S-CAT) to provide affective touch and compared its performance with commonly used brush and human affective touch. The S-CAT device simulates the attributes of CToptimal affective touch in terms of velocity, temperature and force. In 22 participants we administered touch on their forearm from the S-CAT device (robot), a human hand and a soft brush at 6cm/s (CT-optimal speed) and 36cm/s (non-CT optimal speed). We collected subjective ratings on pleasantness and intensity, as well as electroencephalography (EEG) responses. The results showed that pleasantness and intensity ratings depend on velocity of the touch. Moreover, S-CAT touch delivered at these different velocities elicits similar subjective ratings to using a human hand or brush. Findings point to the potential for soft robotic haptic devices to modulate subjective and electrophysiological response in a similar way to more natural, human touch.