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One of the most well‐known descriptive bargaining models is Raiffa's Zone of Possible Agreements (ZOPA). We reinterpret Raiffa's model of a price negotiation in the realm of bounded rationality by applying Simon's theory of Satisficing. Afterward we refine Raiffa's negotiation model using Aspiration Adaptation Theory as suggested by Sauermann, Selten, Tietz and others. We offer a model of a concession process that gives precision to the Dance of Concessions in Raiffa's model by applying axioms of bounded rationality. Raiffa suggests a solution point derived from equity in price dimension, whereas we propose an area solution defined by equity in aspiration levels.

The addition of various gaseous impurities into the process gases used in the chemical vapor deposition of superconducting Nb3normalSn has been found to alter the grain size of Nb3normalSn and thereby the critical current (Ic ). Increasing concentrations of CO2 , CO , and N2 cause a progressive decrease in the particle size and a concomitant increase of Ic up to three times the value found for undoped specimens. In contrast, O2 and CH4 increase the particle size and reduce Ic . Ic is linearly dependent on the reciprocal of the grain size, 1/D, to values of D as small as 400Aå. The present work suggests that impurities serve to control the grain size, presumably by the formation of small second‐phase precipitates which interfere with the growth of Nb3normalSn grains.

Several EU countries discuss introducing deposit systems for single-use bottles to mitigate pollution. However, as an analysis of the German experiences indicates, the introduction of a deposit on single-use beverage containers might unintendedly compromise the endeavor to implement a circular economy. Such unintended effects need to be considered to enable the implementation of a circular economy that prioritizes reduction and reuse compared to recycling.High levels of environmental pollution and low recycling rates have triggered a debate on deposit return systems for single-use beverage containers (BCs) within the European Union. In 2003, Germany statutorily implemented a deposit for single-use BCs, which operates alongside a historically grown deposit system for multi-use bottles. The long-standing German practice can be used as a source of relevant experiences. These experiences show that the introduction of a single-use deposit is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it caused an increase in return and recycling rates of single-use BCs. On the other hand, there were unintended effects on the long-standing multi-use system and, thus, on the endeavor to implement a circular economy where reduction and reuse are prioritized rather than recycling. It seems that the introduction of a single-use deposit system promotes a narrow mode of thinking and a focus on recycling, which hinders the revitalization of multi-use BC systems. The EU’s debate on single-use deposit lacks critical consideration of such unintended effects. The discussion of the German experiences might help to avoid unintended effects that hinder the establishment of a circular economy.