We study the investment–cash flow sensitivities of U.S. firms from 1971–2009. Our tests extend the literature in several key ways and provide strong evidence that cash flow explains investment beyond its correlation with q. A dollar of current- and prior-year cash flow is associated with $0.32 of additional investment for firms that are the least likely to be constrained and $0.63 of additional investment for firms that are the most likely to be constrained, even after correcting for measurement error in q. Our results suggest that financing constraints and free-cash-flow problems are important for investment decisions.

This paper studies the impact of financing decisions on risk-averse managers. Leverage raises stock volatility, driving a wedge between the cost of debt to shareholders and the cost to undiversified, risk-averse managers. I quantify these 'volatility costs' of debt and examine their impact on financing decisions. The paper finds: (1) the volatility costs of debt can be large, particularly if the CEO owns in-the-money options; (2) higher option ownership tends to increase, not decrease, the volatility costs of debt; (3) a stock price increase typically reduces managerial preference for leverage, consistent with prior evidence on security issues. Empirically, I estimate the volatility costs of debt for a large sample of U.S. firms and test whether these costs affect financing decisions. I find strong evidence that volatility costs affect both the level of and short-term changes in debt. Further, a probit model of security issues suggests that managerial preferences help explain a firm's choice between debt and equity.

NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

This paper revisits the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. Instead of classifying turnovers into forced and voluntary, we introduce performance-induced turnover, defined as turnover that would not have occurred had performance been “good.” We document a close turnover-performance link and estimate that 38%–55% of turnovers are performance induced. This is significantly more than the number of forced turnovers, though the two types of turnovers are highly correlated. Compared to the predictions of Bayesian learning models, learning about CEO ability appears to be slow, and boards act as if CEO ability (or match quality) was subject to frequent shocks.

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