Although the practice of holding armed groups to account under human rights law remains controversial and under-theorized as a matter of law, statements from Commissions of Inquiry and United Nations Special Rapporteurs holding armed groups to account under this body of law are relatively commonplace. Motivated by this contradiction, this study aims to clarify when and how armed groups are bound by human rights law. It brings several key issues of clarification to the legal framework. The first part of the book presents a new perspective on the role that human rights law plays in the legal framework that applies to non-international armed conflict. In particular, the study investigates the normative added value that human rights law can bring vis-à-vis international humanitarian law. The second part of the book sheds light on the circumstances in which armed groups acquire obligations under human rights law. Combining historical and comparative research with theoretical analysis on international legal personality, the research demonstrates what the legal frameworks of belligerency, insurgency, and international humanitarian law can tell us about when and how such groups may be bound by human rights law. The third part of the book tests and investigates the four most utilized theories of how armed groups are bound by human rights law, examining (i) treaty law, (ii) control of territory, (iii) international criminal law, and (iv) customary international law. The book’s conclusions are drawn together thematically and contain important practical recommendations for practitioners in this field.

This article draws upon social science literature to offer a new assessment of the normative value of human rights law vis-à-vis international humanitarian law in territory under armed groups' control. In particular, the article considers how the two bodies of law can be applied in a complementary manner to regulate the everyday life of civilians who are not involved in hostilities. The article demonstrates that while it might be tempting to imagine that concerns relating to rights such as the freedom of movement, the right to work or protection from common crime are completely displaced by considerations of physical security and survival in times of armed conflict, in reality this is often not the case.

This article shows that between the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Tehran conference in 1968, international human rights law and international humanitarian law and their respective guardian institutions, the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), were not so conceptually far apart as is sometimes suggested. Its purpose is to give further legitimacy to the role of human rights law in armed conflict and show that cooperation between the UN and the ICRC has a long history.

Examining the situations of Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine, this article demonstrates how individuals living outside the control of the de jure government struggle to access birth registration and civil status documentation in times of non-international armed conflict. Evaluating how the right to legal identity is protected in international law, the article highlights the need for legal identity to be better protected in armed conflict, so that its conferral and denial is not used as a weapon by the fighting parties.

Drawing upon literature relating to armed groups and international law, this article provides insights on the question of whether customary international law can accommodate non-state actors at the level of duty-bearers and norm-makers. Demonstrating that customary international law can accommodate considerable diversity at the level of duty-bearers, it argues that customary international law will struggle to accommodate diversity at the level of its makers. In particular, it points out that the character of armed groups is so different from that of states, that it is unclear how their practice could be taken into account alongside those of states. Yet, the article demonstrates that there are also problems in a methodology relying upon only state practice and opinio juris, as evidence of customary norms binding on a diversity of actors. It shows that this is particularly the case for human rights law, where the identity of the norm-making entity 'as a state' is highly determinative of the nature of its practice and opinio juris.